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A. Time to Change the Dynamics 
My previous report submitted in connection with the National Taxpayer 
Advocate’s 2007 Annual Report to Congress concerned the role of practitioners in 
taxpayer decisions to comply with the tax laws, with a focus on the Earned Income Tax 
Credit and sole proprietor reporting of income.1  My report described the significant 
usage of paid preparers and the high incidence of errors among those returns, summarized 
a significant amount of the research relating to the role of preparers in tax compliance 
decisions, and offered a preliminary typology identifying the various categories of 
preparers and how the various types of preparers may prepare erroneous returns.2  As the 
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1 See generally Leslie Book, Study of the Role of Preparers in Relation to Taxpayer 
Compliance with Internal Revenue Laws [hereinafter Book, Role of Preparers] in 2007 
NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE ANNUAL REPORT TO CON. VOL. 2 44-74 (Taxpayer 
Advocate Service) [hereinafter 2007 NTA REPORT VOL. 2]. 
2 See generally id.  As in my initial report, this report focuses on ways that preparers can 
assist in reducing the underreporting portion of the tax gap, particularly with respect to 
issues not associated with legal ambiguity (like the potential classification of transactions 
as corporate tax shelters) or significant factual uncertainty (like valuation cases in transfer 
pricing cases). Those issues implicate different legislative and administrative responses, 
and, in particular, the ways that government can temper practitioners from improperly 
exploiting ambiguity. Current research suggests that preparers have tended to exploit 
ambiguity on behalf of their clients, but this report does not address that. In part, my 
decision to focus on these unambiguous issues is attributable to a prior lack of emphasis 
on the preparers’ role in issues not involving significant legal or factual ambiguity, 
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Government Accountability Office (“GAO”) has reported, inaccuracies on preparers’ 
returns are not necessarily the fault of the preparer.3 Yet, limited quantitative data 
associates a significant amount of tax-reporting error to returns that are prepared by paid 
practitioners.4 A growing amount of qualitative research—including some limited use of 
                                                                                                                                                 
despite quantitative evidence showing heavy taxpayer reliance on preparers for issues 
like the reporting of income attributable to sole proprietors. See GOVERNMENT 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, TAX GAP: A STRATEGY FOR REDUCING THE GAP SHOULD 
INCLUDE OPTIONS FOR ADDRESSING SOLE PROPRIETOR NONCOMPLIANCE (GAO-07-1014, 
July, 2007) [hereinafter GAO, TAX GAP] (discussing a broad approach to reducing the 
underreporting gap among sole proprietors but failing to integrate preparer strategies in 
that approach) 
3 GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, TAX PREPARERS: OREGON’S REGULATORY 
REGIME MAY LEAD TO IMPROVED FEDERAL TAX RETURN ACCURACY AND PROVIDES A 
POSSIBLE MODEL FOR NATIONAL REGULATION 7 (GAO-08-781, Aug., 2008) [hereinafter 
GAO, OREGON/CALIFORNIA PREPARER REGISTRATION STUDY] (noting, for example, that 
taxpayers providing incorrect information to preparers may trigger errors in such returns). 
4 The GAO has determined that a statistically significant difference in error rates exists 
between those returns prepared by the taxpayers themselves and those prepared by paid 
practitioners.  GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, PAID TAX RETURN PREPARERS: IN 
A LIMITED STUDY, CHAIN PREPARERS MADE SERIOUS ERRORS 28 (GAO-06-563T, Apr. 4, 
2006) [hereinafter GAO, LIMITED STUDY].  The following is a table of comparative error 
rates among Form 1040 filings by paid practitioners and by the taxpayers themselves, 
based on 2001 NRP data. 
Type of Return Estimate (percent) 
Prepared by a paid preparer 56 
Prepared by the taxpayer 47 
All returns 52 
Id.  My initial report also quantified the limited data relating to relative error rates among 
types of return preparers. Book, Role of Preparers, supra note 1, at 68. That the IRS 
should readily capture data tying taxpayer error to preparer usage is an important first 
step in any systematic approach to focusing on the role of preparers in taxpayer 
compliance decisions. My suggestion that the IRS monitor preparers, and require a 
uniform preparer identification number, may help facilitate this.  See infra section III.A. 
The following is a table of error rates among specific line items in Form 1040, relating to 
2001. 
Form 1040 Line Item Self-prepared returns 
(percent) 
Returns done by paid 
preparer (percent) 
Deductions 23 31 
Foreign tax credit 16 6 
Earned Income Credit 45 53 
Refund 43 57 
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mystery shopper scenarios—identifies significant preparer misconduct, including 
misconduct that would potentially trigger the IRS imposing civil or criminal penalties.5
In my initial report, I called for additional qualitative research to better understand 
the dynamics of the taxpayer-practitioner relationship.6 I likewise urged the IRS to better 
capture data as a prerequisite to further efforts relating to preparers’ ability to reduce 
systemic underreporting with respect to different areas of the tax law.7
This report discusses a number of prescriptive actions Congress and the IRS can 
take to change the posture of preparers with respect to compliance with unambiguous 
issues like claiming the EITC and reporting sole proprietor income. The common themes 
of the proposals are increasing the visibility of preparer and taxpayer conduct, and 
emphasizing the responsibility and accountability of preparers to the tax system, as well 
as to their clients. Because the relationship between the practitioner and the taxpayer is 
dynamic, some of the proposals look to the taxpayer and others to the preparer.  As part 
of any meaningful strategy to reduce the tax gap, the IRS must more actively strive to 
understand the preparer community. As part of a preparer strategy, it must demonstrate 
engagement with issues that are systemic compliance problems through identifying 
                                                                                                                                                 
 GAO, LIMITED STUDY, supra at 28. 
5 See generally id.; TREASURY INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR TAX ADMINISTRATION, MOST 
TAX RETURNS PREPARED BY A LIMITED SAMPLE OF UNENROLLED PREPARERS CONTAINED 
SIGNIFICANT ERRORS (2008-40-171, Sept. 3, 2008) [hereinafter TIGTA, LIMITED 
SAMPLE]; see also Chi Chi Wu et al., Tax Preparers Take a Bite out of Refunds: Mystery 
Shopper Test Exposes Refund Anticipation Loan Abuses in Durham and Philadelphia 
(April 2008) (finding a wide range of preparer errors and abuses despite the fact that 
quality of return preparation was not the focus of study). 
6 Book, Role of Preparers, supra note 1, at 51.  See also Robert Kidder & Craig 
McEwen, Taxpaying Behavior in Social Context: A Tentative Typology of Tax 
Compliance and Noncompliance, in 2 TAXPAYER COMPLIANCE 47 (Jeffrey Roth et al. 
eds., 1989) (postulating that preparers can broker and facilitate both compliance and 
noncompliance). 
7 Book, Role of Preparers, supra note 1, at 74. 
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preparers, communicating with preparers, and educating preparers and taxpayers,8 all as 
part of a broad-based effort to achieve acceptable compliance levels.9 In this report, I 
offer several steps that tie into my themes of responsibility, visibility and competence. 
The steps include reforming due-diligence rules by anchoring obligations to data 
reflective of systemic noncompliance, requiring the use a common preparer identification 
number to facilitate the creation of a reliable database that will enhance the IRS’s ability 
to tie specific preparers to returns that are likely erroneous, and registering and testing 
preparers to ensure a minimum competence level and inject a more uniform sense of 
professionalism into the industry. In addition, to emphasize accountability, visibility and 
responsibility for taxpayers as well as preparers, Congress and IRS should require more 
robust taxpayer self-reporting for items connected to systemic noncompliance. Examples 
of this include separately scheduling out items of gross receipts on Schedule C (such as 
credit card versus cash receipts) so taxpayers and practitioners bring areas of 
noncompliance to the surface.  
 While the increased expectations with respect to preparers should not 
fundamentally change the role they play in the tax system, it does assume that preparers 
have an affirmative obligation to enhance the tax system’s integrity, especially in areas 
                                                 
8 Marjorie Kornhauser, Tax Compliance and the Education of John (and Jane) Q. 
Taxpayer, Tax Notes, Nov. 10, 2008, 737, 740 [hereinafter Kornhauser, Compliance and 
Education] (discussing how any serious attempt at tax compliance must seek to educate 
taxpayers to increase tax morale, including linking taxes to the positive benefits of 
government to strengthen people’s attitudes to the government).  See also, Marjorie 
Kornhauser, Normative and Cognitive Aspects of Tax Compliance: Literature Review and 
Recommendations for the IRS Regarding Individual Taxpayers, in 2007 NTA Report 
VOL. 2, supra note 1, at  138-171. 
9 I take no direct position in this paper as to what an acceptable compliance rate is. 
Recent tax gap data, however, shows significant systemic areas of noncompliance 
associated with certain issues or taxpayers, including that associated with EITC claimants 
and sole proprietors. See Book, Role of Preparers, supra note 1, at 65-68.  
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associated with unacceptable error rates and high preparer usage. Efforts to increase 
visibility and accountability can contribute to preparers taking responsibility for returns 
they submit, educating new entrants into the tax system (or new entrants with respect to 
specific issues where data suggests areas of high noncompliance, like when there are new 
Schedule C filers visiting a preparer) and make bad actors fear IRS exposure and possible 
sanction through enhanced monitoring and data-tracking.  
Others have written about the importance of education to tax compliance, with the 
need to tie in as part of any serious effort to increase compliance with a more robust 
effort at educating taxpayers.10 The IRS can leverage the educational role that preparers 
can (and do) play in the system, through communicating with preparers—in person or in 
writing—who have a threshold of new schedule C returns, for example, or other 
relatively new entrants to the tax system. With respect to targeting preparers who have 
prepared returns suggestive of high rates of noncompliance,11 or some other benchmark 
significantly higher than industry or preparer averages, like information on client return 
DIF scores that are outside the norm, math error activity on client returns, or examination 
results that are suggestive of higher adjustments than an appropriate benchmark, IRS 
efforts to communicate with preparers can demonstrate that preparer actions are visible, 
and allow the IRS to position itself as a service provider and educator to both the preparer 
and the taxpayer. The agency use of information to influence compliance through a tiered 
                                                 
10 See generally, Kornhauser, Compliance and Education, supra note 8. 
11 For example, the Discriminant Function (DiF) scores—a metric of the likelihood of 
gaining additional tax payments in the case of an audit—for 1040-SS and 1040-PR (Self-
Employment Tax Returns) are significantly lower than the DiF scores for Schedule C and 
F filings where the EITC is present and gross receipts are less than $25,000, regardless of 
the type of preparer. (Unpublished IRS data on Average DiF Scores by Activity Code and 
Preparer Classification for Tax Year 2006 (2008)).  
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approach reflective of educating and progressing toward a more sanction-based approach 
to preparers is not my idea alone, but the need to tie in this approach to the IRS’s more 
systematic capturing of preparer data is not a part of the IRS’s implemented strategy.12
 In the near background, the IRS must have the tools to remind the potential bad 
actors that sanctions are always a possibility for egregious misconduct. 
My proposals recognize that while enforcement at the back-end requires significant 
agency resources, an emphasis on front-end compliance efforts—like identifying 
preparers and testing competence, and communicating both in person and in writing—
does not necessarily put the agency in the typical command-and-control regulatory 
posture, with the resource-intensive demands of preparer audits and the continued use of 
civil injunction powers to shut down bad preparers. First steps can be tied to educating, 
serving and informing preparers of best practices, so long as the IRS is willing to 
continue monitoring and to impose more intrusive sanctions on bad actors. The old audit-
first approach cannot work, given agency resource issues and the backlash that would 
likely accompany a meaningful increase in IRS audits of preparers and small business 
taxpayers.13 This approach, which borrows from the insights of scholars and regulators 
who have adopted a responsive regulation framework, is further discussed below in 
Section V. 
                                                 
12 See Michael Albert, Kim Bloomquist & Ron Edgerton, Evaluating Preparation 
Accuracy of Tax Practitioners: A Bootstrap Approach, 2007 IRS Research Conference 
77, 89 (2007) (“[W]e believe that a substantial reduction in the number of AUR [a 
noncompliance metric] discrepancies could be achieved by annually monitoring tax 
practitioners using data-driven techniques . . . in combination with a program of outreach 
and education to the selected preparers”). 
13 This point is especially germane in times of economic difficulty, as materially 
increasing compliance efforts directed at small businesses, at times when small 
businesses are facing significant short-term economic pressures, would likely generate 
intense political pressure on the IRS. 
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B. The Current Landscape 
A common theme among those skeptical of additional government regulation of 
preparers is that adding new measures directed at preparers makes little sense given the 
limited information about the role that preparers play (namely whether errors are tied to 
poor scruples, or incompetence, or whether the errors are more properly attributable to 
some characteristic of the taxpayer), and the lack of meaningful or sustained 
governmental effort within the existing regulatory framework.14 Despite the need for 
additional information and the admittedly inadequate attention given to preparers, the 
importance of preparers to tax compliance and the need for at a minimum a more robust 
understanding of the preparer community seems compelling. Consider the following: 
• The use of paid preparers has been increasing significantly over the past several 
years;15 
• IRS does not know how many paid preparers there are;16 
• Preparers often overlook current rules about preparer identification and due 
diligence (despite how limited they are), and  the IRS often overlooks these 
violations;17 
                                                 
14 See H&R Block, H&R Block Voices Concerns with Proposed Rules That Would Limit 
Solicitation of Refund Anticipation Loans, TAX NOTES, May 1, 2008, LEXIS, 2008 TNT 
85-21 [hereinafter Block Comments] at nn.100-103 and surrounding text; Christine C. 
Bauman & Katrina L. Mantzke, An Education and Enforcement Approach to Dealing 
with Unscrupulous Tax Preparers, 2 Am. Tax’n Ass’n J. Legal Tax Res. (June 11, 2004). 
15 In 1996, approximately 63 million (53 percent) of individual income tax returns were 
prepared by paid practitioners.  By 2005, that number had risen to over 80 million (62 
percent).  SOI Taxpayer Usage Study 1998 & 2006. 
16 “The IRS acknowledges that it does not know how many paid preparers exist and 
cannot determine the full extent of noncompliance and incompetence among 
practitioners.”  TREASURY INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR TAX ADMINISTRATION, MOST 
RETURNS PREPARED BY A LIMITED SAMPLE OF UNENROLLED PREPARERS CONTAINED 
SIGNIFICANT ERRORS 2-3 (Ref. No. 2008-40-171, Sept. 3, 2008) [hereinafter TIGTA, 
UNENROLLED PREPARERS].  Cf. GAO, LIMITED STUDY, supra note 4, at 5 (noting that not 
all paid preparers provide preparer information on returns they prepare). 
17 See TIGTA, UNENROLLED PREPARERS, supra note 5, at 5 (noting sixty-one percent of 
returns prepared in mystery shopper study were prepared incorrectly); cf. Regulation of 
Federal Tax Return Preparers, Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Finance, 109th Cong. 6 
(July 20, 2005) (written statement of Nina E. Olson, National Taxpayer Advocate) 
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• IRS does not meaningfully capture data to allow for monitoring or tracking 
preparer performance; 
• Limited quantitative data suggest high error rates associated with returns that paid 
practitioners prepare and file on behalf of taxpayers;18 
• In most of the country there is no requirement that preparers demonstrate any 
level of competence before they can begin to prepare tax returns, nor are there 
meaningful continuing education requirements despite the constant legislative 
changes to the tax law and a general sense that preparers’ lack of understanding of 
some areas of the tax law contributes to both underreporting and missed 
opportunities for taxpayers;19 
• Many preparers are engaged in return preparation as an ancillary business to the 
selling of other products or services, with (i) the increased profit potential from 
these ancillary sales raising questions about preparer incentives and motivation to 
professionalize their tax return preparation functions; and (ii) consumer demand 
for these products in close proximity to the return preparation process providing 
potential fuel for improper taxpayer or preparer conduct;20 
• Among issues not characterized by legal ambiguity, preparers may limit personal 
responsibility by hiding behind a “don’t ask, don’t tell” approach to facts that may 
be germane to computing a correct tax return, which makes it difficult—if not 
impossible—for the government to assign responsibility for errors;21 
• When Congress and IRS have changed the rules of the “don’t ask, don’t tell” 
approach, the changes have been insufficient and there has been a demonstrated 
lack of  sustained governmental interest in enforcing the limited rules or making 
these changes visible to both taxpayers and the IRS itself;22 
                                                                                                                                                 
[hereinafter Olson Hearing Testimony], available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
utl/testimony_wm_oversight_returnpreparers.pdf. 
18 GAO, LIMITED STUDY, supra note 4, at 23, 25, 28-29 (laying out tables comparing 
error rates between returns prepared by paid practitioners and returns prepared by 
taxpayers). 
19 “Most paid preparers are not subject to any education, testing, or registration 
requirements.  Two states, California and Oregon, are exceptions in that . . . they have 
had their own requirements that apply to paid preparers working in their states.”  GAO, 
OREGON/CALIFORNIA PREPARER REGISTRATION STUDY, supra note 3, at 1. Maryland has 
also recently imposed a registration requirement for return preparers, See below, at Part 
IV 
20  NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE 2007 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS. 83, 86 (Taxpayer 
Advocate Service) [hereinafter 2007 NTA REPORT]. 
21 Susan Cleary Morse, Stewart Karlinsky & Joseph Bankman, Cash Businesses and Tax 
Evasion, Stan. L. & Pol’y Rev. (forthcoming 2009) (manuscript at 24-25) (discussing 
practices of “don’t ask, don’t tell” preparers); Susan Cleary Morse, Using Salience and 
Influence to Narrow the Tax Gap, 39 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. (forthcoming 2009) (manuscript at 
n.76 and applicable text) (discussing interviews that suggest at least some practitioners 
fall into a “don’t ask, don’t tell” norm). 
22 Olson Hearing Testimony, supra note 17, at 6-7. 
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• The limited qualitative research suggests that preparers make errors characterized 
by both incompetence and lack of meaningful diligence;23 
• Noncompliance among preparers and taxpayers may become habitual, which 
suggests that IRS monitoring and educating new taxpayers or preparers is 
important as a means of stemming years of possible problems;24 
• The possible concentration of incompetent or unscrupulous preparers and 
noncompliant taxpayers suggests that if IRS meaningfully captures preparer data 
and correlates preparers with possible benchmarks of taxpayer noncompliance, 
and (DiF scores, industry averages, etc.), the IRS can efficiently touch significant 
levels of noncompliance.25 
 
 
II. EMPHASIZING RESPONSIBILITY 
 
A. The Types of Taxpayers and Preparers—General Classification 
 
Given the above, in this section I discuss specific proposals that build on the 
information that we know, and I highlight areas where immediate attention is required.  
As context for these proposals, I return to the challenges associated with identifying types 
of preparers and types of taxpayers. Mapping taxpayers and preparers is essential to assist 
the IRS and Congress in understanding the causes of noncompliance. The underlying 
reasons for errors will likely assist in formulating administrative or legislative solutions, 
and serves as an important backdrop to this and my prior report. 
Many studies have been done about taxpayer compliance and the reasons behind 
decisions not to comply.  Some economic deterrence models have studied the interaction 
                                                 
23 TIGTA, UNENROLLED PREPARERS, supra note 5, at 5 (noting that some mistakes and 
omissions were the results of mistakes or misinterpretation of the tax law); GAO, 
LIMITED STUDY, supra note 4, at 17-25 (identifying sources of filing mistakes in mystery 
shopper scenario). 
24 See Kidder & McEwen, supra note 6. 
25 Albert et al., supra note 12 (looking at data within one state, and finding that a small 
number of preparers were likely responsible for a significant amount of errors in the 
Automatic Underreporting Program, and also concluding that a program of monitoring 
and educating tax preparers may substantially reduce noncompliance); Stuart Karlinsky 
& Joseph Bankman, Developing a Theory of Cash Business Tax Evasion Behavior and 
the Role of their Tax Preparers, in 5th International Conference on Tax Administration 
164 (2002). 
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between the taxpayer and the government as more of a “strategic game – where each 
party makes the best response to the other’s strategy in light of available information – 
rather than a static gamble.”26  Although more advanced than the models that considered 
decisions between taxpayers and the administration to be independent of each other, this 
still fails to consider the role tax practitioners play in the mix. 
In my initial study, I discussed  research that examined the relationship between 
preparers and taxpayers, and how that relationship contributes to compliance decisions: 
Some studies support the view that practitioners view taxpayers as instigators of 
aggressive advice, but also recognize that the search for a single model to explain 
the complex dynamics of practitioner/taxpayer interaction is likely to be futile.   
Sakurai and Braithwaite, for example, classify practitioners into three distinct 
types: 1) honest and risk adverse 2) cautious minimizers of tax, and 3) the creative 
and aggressive planner.  Sakurai and Braithwaite concluded that the latter is the 
least popular in terms of taxpayer preference, but that this aggressive practitioner 
type is of particular concern.  They suggested that taxpayers are inclined to seek 
out preparers who share their values.  This insight is consistent with Karlinsky 
and Bankman’s study of sole proprietor noncompliance, where sole proprietors 
intent on minimizing income sought preparers they knew who would be 
comfortable with their approach.  It is also consistent with Albert, Bloomquist and 
Edgerton’s study of underreporting, which suggests that a relatively small number 
of practitioners are responsible for a disproportionate share of underreporting of 
certain types of income.  Likewise, Kidder and McEwen, adapting a sociological 
approach, postulated that there are different types of practitioners, those that 




As my prior research suggests, there is a general understanding that taxpayers present 
themselves to practitioners in one of three ways: 
                                                 
26 Sagit Leviner, A New Era of Tax Enforcement: From ‘Big Stick’ to Responsive 
Regulation 18 (Univ. Mich. Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Paper Series, 
Paper No. 68, 2006). 
27 Book, Role of Preparers, supra note 1, at 59-60.  See also Albert et al., supra note 12; 
Yuka Sakurai, and Valerie Braithwaite, Taxpayer’s Perceptions of the Ideal Tax Adviser: 
Playing Safe or Saving Dollars? (Centre for Tax System Integrity, Working Paper No. 5, 
2001), available at http://ctsi.anu.edu.au/publications/WP/5.pdf; Karlinsky & Bankman, 
supra note 25; Kidder & McEwen, supra note 6. 
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1. They are intent on understating their liabilities or over claiming refunds (Type 1 
taxpayers); 
2. They are indifferent about understating their liabilities or over claiming their 
refunds (Type 2 taxpayers)—these taxpayers will likely defer to the practitioner’s 
advice; or 
3. They seek assistance in preparing their returns correctly (Type 3 taxpayers).28 
 
Preparers, on the other hand, drawing on the Sakurai and Braithwaite, Bankman and 
Karlinsky model (and supported in part by my focus group research) generally fall into 
one of three categories: 
1. They are intent on helping clients understate their liabilities or over claim refunds 
(Type 1 preparers); 
2. They are indifferent about whether their clients comply with their tax reporting or 
refund claiming (Type 2 preparers); or 
3. They are intent on ensuring that clients properly report their liabilities or claim 
their refunds (Type 3 preparers).29 
 
In my first report, I emphasized that the IRS would learn a great deal about 
possible solutions to the tax gap by exploring the relationship between taxpayers and 
preparers, focusing on the way that certain types of preparers interact with taxpayers who 
present different characteristics. Others have likewise emphasized that given the 
important role that preparers play, researchers and tax administrators should pay more 
attention to actual interactions between taxpayers and practitioners.30 I will return to this 
                                                 
28 See Book, Role of Preparers, supra note 1, at 61. 
29 See id. at 59 (citing Sakurai & Braithwaite, supra note 27, at iv).  Sakurai and 
Braithwaite characterize preparers as “honest and risk averse,” “cautious minimizers of 
tax,” and “creative and aggressive planner[s].”  Sakurai & Braithwaite, supra note 27, at 
iv. 
30 Margaret McKerchar, Why Do Taxpayers Comply?  Past Lessons and Future 
Directions in Developing a Model of Compliance Behaviour, in TAX ADMINISTRATION IN 
THE 21ST CENTURY 225, 241 (Michael Walpole & Chris Evand eds., 2001) (emphasizing 
the importance of identifying various typologies of noncompliance and urging that 
additional studies be made relating to actual taxpayer and preparer behavior).  Professor 
Tan, for example, notes that several areas are in need of research, including: (1) to what 
extent practitioners are willing to give in to client demands and to what extent clients are 
willing to adopt practitioners’ advice; (2) whether the client or the practitioner has greater 
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classification scheme in Part III B. when considering the ways the IRS can use mystery 
shopper scenarios to help gauge preparer motivations and reasons behind potentially 
erroneous returns. 
This desire to appreciate the dynamic relationship should animate future research 
that the IRS conducts into the preparer’s role in the decision to comply or not to comply 
with the tax law. Despite the current lack of information, there are specific steps that 
Congress and the IRS can take that build on what we know about the relationship 
between preparers and taxpayers. These steps will likely contribute to fewer errors 
associated with preparer-generated individual income tax returns. 
 
 
B. It is Time to Tie Preparer Due Diligence to Areas of Systemic Noncompliance 
 
1. Current Due Diligence Rules Are Not Adequately Designed to Ensure that 
Preparers Emphasize their Responsibility to the Integrity of the Tax System 
 
As I and others have stated,31 relying on due diligence rules to either temper 
practitioners’ willingness to become type 1 or type 2 preparers, or check the appetites of 
type 1 taxpayers, is limited by the difficulty of attributing knowledge—for example, 
                                                                                                                                                 
influence over tax decisions; (3) what (if any) effect the length of the working 
relationship between client and preparer has on tax decision making; (4) what factors 
steer the working relationship between client and preparer; (5) whether practitioner 
advice is affected by firm size; (6) whether practitioners are “client driven”; and (7) how 
the practitioner balances the requirements of the tax law, their clients’ interest, their 
professional responsibilities, and the demands of the organization they work in. Lin Mei 
Tan, Research on the Role of Tax Practitioners in Taxpayer Compliance: Identifying 
Some of the Gaps, in TAXATION ISSUES IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (ed. Sawyer) 
(2006). 
31 See Book, Role of Preparers, supra note 1, at 69-70 (laying out typology showing how 
different levels of preparer awareness of tax law and client motives affects compliance); 
Morse et al., supra note 21, at 23-24 (discussing how particular practitioners’ compliance 
decisions are driven by amount of knowledge they have). 
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knowledge of a sole proprietor’s unreported income-- to the preparer.32 Current rules 
provide that preparers may not ignore the implications of what they know and must make 
reasonable inquiries if information appears to be incorrect.33 Yet, there is no sense of 
additional preparer obligations with respect to issues that are characterized by systemic 
noncompliance. Moreover, standards meant to inform preparers concerning when they 
are supposed to make further inquiry are tied to generally vague and adaptable common 
law negligence standards, providing less than clear guidance and likely inconsistent 
application of the existing standards.34  
                                                 
32 Morse, supra note 21, at 18. 
33 See Morse et al., supra note 21, at 19-25.  Penalties against noncompliant preparers are 
structured in a way to penalize more heavily those preparers who are more active in the 
filing of noncompliant returns. Those preparers who understate a taxpayer’s liability due 
to an unrealistic position are fined either $1,000 or 50% of the income derived, whichever 
is greater.  Preparers who understate a taxpayer’s liability through willful or reckless 
conduct are fined $5,000 or 50% of the income derived, whichever is greater.  Failure to 
exercise due diligence in determining EITC eligibility brings a $100 fine per failure.  See 
I.R.C. §§ 6694(a)-(b), 6695(g) (2006). 
34 A recent article considered the lawyer’s ability to rely on a taxpayer’s recitation of 
facts. See Jasper Cummings, When Can a Tax Attorney Rely on Taxpayer’s 
Representation of Facts, Fed. Taxes Wkly. Alert, Aug. 21, 2008 (noting that preparers 
may generally rely on a taxpayer’s representation of facts, subject to reason). Cummings 
notes, for example, that Treasury Circular 230 warns against “false statements,” which 
have been interpreted as including “failure to ask an obvious question in a commonplace 
situation” and that “the absence of a fact or the untrustworthiness of the client may 
require the lawyer to go farther.” Yet, Cummings notes that while there are myriad 
factors which may put the lawyer on notice that more inquiry is needed, the standard is 
tied to the reasonable standards associated with common law negligence, “with all of its 
nuance and adaptability.” Cummings points to examples where the IRS has held that 
preparers had an obligation to ask additional questions of their clients, relating to (i) a 
client who claimed that he used his car in his work and the preparer failed to ask whether 
that involved nondeductible commuting, or (ii) a preparer who failed to inquire about the 
purpose of trips that a client claimed to be business-related. Id. (referring to Scenario of 
Disciplinary Action, 1997-13 IRB 32). 
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One approach that I and others have emphasized as a general matter is that the 
IRS needs to move away from a one-size-fits-all approach to noncompliance.35  If 
research suggests high areas of noncompliance associated with specific types of issues, 
our tax system should more affirmatively impose upon preparers an obligation to ask 
questions that relate to ferreting out facts that will at a minimum (i) place the 
responsibility for taxpayer actions squarely on the taxpayer’s shoulders and (ii) 
discourage preparers from becoming facilitators of noncompliance by limiting their 
ability to hide behind clients and avoid any existing affirmative obligations by choosing 
not to ask relevant questions. 
Consider the touchy subject of inquiring about a taxpayer’s lifestyle if the 
preparer knows that the lifestyle is inconsistent with the information the taxpayer gives to 
the preparer.36  It is difficult to calibrate preparer responsibilities because return preparers 
                                                 
35 See, e.g., Leslie Book, Preventing the Hybrid from Backfiring: Delivery of Benefits to 
the Working Poor Through the Tax System, 2006 Wis. L. Rev. 1103, 1146-49 (2006)  
[hereinafter Book, Hybrid] (proposing more stringent set of due diligence requirements 
for paid preparers); Alex Raskolnikov, Beyond Deterrence: Targeting Tax Enforcement 
with a Penalty Default 19-20 (Columbia Law & Econ. Working Paper No. 337, 2008). 
Cf. GAO, Tax Gap, supra note 2, at 26 (“Treasury’s tax gap strategy does not discuss 
specific options to address the tax gap overall or sole proprietor income in particular.”).  
36 My focus group participants, for example, were asked the following: 
 
Assume a potential new client comes to you and is interested in retaining you.  
You have seen this client around town, and know that he has recently spent 
hundreds of thousands of dollars on a major home renovation, that his kids go to 
the same private school as your children, and that he belongs to the poshest 
country club in town.  Prior to the meeting, to be more productive, you ask to 
review the prior year’s income tax returns.  On the returns you review, you notice 
that the income claimed on the return seems low based upon the lifestyle that you 
have observed.  What, if anything, should you do in terms of due diligence (i) 
prior to agreeing to be this individual’s return preparer, or (ii) as part of your 
services in preparing his tax return if he only provides information that is 
consistent with the prior year’s reported income? 
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wishing to attract and retain clients properly do not view themselves as having to cross-
examine them on subjects that have a potential to alienate them or bring into question the 
preparer’s loyalty to those clients. Interviews with preparers who have ties to the cash 
economy illustrate that some preparers engage in actively signaling to the taxpayer their 
lack of interest in knowing harmful facts.37 My focus group research suggested that while 
some preparers indicated they would make inquiries to tie the taxpayer’s circumstances to 
the information on the return, and turn away business if they were uncomfortable with an 
inconsistency with the taxpayer’s general economic circumstances and the tax return 
information, that was by no means the norm. There was significant disagreement about 
what kinds of questions preparers should ask as part of the return preparation process and 
the preparers’ role in asking questions, given that there may be legitimate reasons for the 
discrepancies (e.g., inheritances and prior receipt of reported taxable income). This 
discomfort was exacerbated especially if there was only general awareness highlighting 
inconsistencies between the taxpayer’s lifestyle and the information the taxpayer 
presented in the return.38
In addition, with the exception of the EITC, there is little connection between 
what preparers are required to ask taxpayers and the research that has identified systemic 
areas of high noncompliance. The current tax compliance regime does not tie due 
diligence to the underlying issues, but rather to the preparer’s underlying knowledge of 
individual circumstances that would trigger a duty of further inquiry under general 
                                                                                                                                                 
See Leslie Book, Focus Group: 2007 IRS Nationwide Tax Forum (focus group data on 
file with author) [hereinafter Book, Focus Group]. 
37 See Morse et al., supra note 21, at 24-25 (discussing the “don’t ask, don’t tell” 
approach some paid practitioners use). 
38 See Book, Focus Group, supra note 36. 
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negligence principles. I believe it is time to tie preparer inquiry levels into research about 
systemic noncompliance problems within the tax system. This research should inform a 
preparer’s specific due diligence obligations, at least to some degree, and facilitate 
specific guidance from the IRS as to what is important and perhaps what preparers should 
be required to ask. While Congress has legislated specific due diligence rules for the 
EITC, even when Congress or the IRS has instituted something beyond the normal 
posture that highlights the preparers’ role in the system (and implicitly connects the due 
diligence obligation to systemic areas of noncompliance), the requirements do not 
emphasize the preparer’s role in preventing errors nor do they require the preparer to ask 
sufficient questions to isolate responsibility for potential errors.   
Some researchers have begun to identify the inadequacy of the current due 
diligence regime. As Morse indicates, Section 6694 (even before the recent legislative 
change essentially restoring preparer standards to those of taxpayers for undisclosed 
return positions) and Circular 230 do not change preparer obligations to inquire into 
taxpayer circumstances,39 and generally allow preparers to rely on taxpayer-provided 
information without any inquiry into its accuracy.40 While the preparer cannot turn a 
                                                 
39 Morse et al., supra note 21, at 24-25.  See also Book, Focus Group, supra note 36. In 
focus group research I conducted for the IRS, I asked preparers about the due diligence 
they would engage in or the inquiry they would conduct with a client who reported 
income inconsistent with their lifestyle.  See id.  There was wide disagreement about the 
appropriate role that preparers should play when they have general information which is 
inconsistent with information on a tax return. A significant number of preparers 
cautioned against jumping to conclusions based on lifestyle, given the possibility that 
many people had sources of funds that were not inconsistent with the information 
presented to return preparers (e.g., gifts, prior inheritances).  Id. 
40See id. Note that Congress has specifically legislated substantiation requirements with 
respect to some individual itemized deductions susceptible to abuse, thus triggering levels 
of inquiry and preparer due diligence to the substantive entitlement to the deduction. See, 
e.g., I.R.C. § 274(d) (2006) (requiring strict substantiation for all travel expenses). 
 16
blind eye to the implications of information given to them, or information actually known 
by the preparer, there is little in terms of practical advice given to preparers about the 
need to inquire further in light of information on general lifestyle, for example, or in the 
face of facts relating to tax issues reflective of systemic taxpayer underreporting of 
income.41
Prior Congressional and administrative action directed at EITC claimants 
heightened due diligence requirements and attempted to address these general concerns. 
However, as the National Taxpayer Advocate have previously identified, the IRS’s 
implementation of the rules has been inadequate, and there is ample opportunity for 
legislative changes to make the provisions more meaningful.42 For example, 
implementing a tiered penalty structure, as well as requiring the preparer to sign under 
penalties of perjury and submit the due diligence attestation to both the IRS and the 
claimants, would increase the visibility and significance of the preparer action.43 The 
IRS, apparently accepting the possibility that its due diligence rules in this area may play 
a more meaningful role, is investigating the possibility of refining the EITC due diligence 
requirements to require practitioners to ask claimants questions that correlate to higher 
                                                 
41 Morse et al., for example, discuss three different spending strategies cash business 
owners use to keep from reporting cash revenues as income: “spend it,” “hoard it,” and 
“invest it in the business.”  Often, these actions are an attempt to hide the income from 
the accountant or the tax preparer.  Some practitioners seek out correct information in 
order to foster compliance with the tax law, while others employ a “don’t ask, don’t tell” 
approach.  See Morse et al., supra note 21, at 19-25.  See generally Cummings, supra 
note 34. Widespread disagreement among my focus group participants, who were mostly 
enrolled preparers, reflects at a minimum the need to address what expectations the IRS 
should place on preparers in this context.  See Book, Focus Group, supra note 36. 
42 Olson Hearing Testimony, supra note 17, at 6-8. 
43Book, Hybrid, supra note 35, at 1146-49 (suggesting more stringent due diligence 
requirements on paid preparers); Olson Hearing Testimony, supra note 17, at 7 
(proposing tiered penalty structure for violations of EITC due diligence requirements). 
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error rates and perhaps identify documentary sources of evidence that, for example, tie 
qualifying children to the residence of the taxpayer.44  
Changes to this effect would be significant and could likely influence taxpayer 
and practitioner conduct at minimal cost. Consider the residency requirement under the 
EITC rules, in which the taxpayer and the child must live together for more than six 
months.45 The specific statutory EITC due diligence requirements for preparers have not 
pushed preparers to gather information that would flag likely errors relating to the 
residency requirement. Despite the fact that failing to meet the residency requirement is 
one of the largest sources of EITC errors,46 in Form 8867, the EITC due diligence 
checklist, question 11 is the only question that addresses the residence of children.  It 
reads as follows: 
“Did the child live with the taxpayer in the United States for over half of the 
year?”47
 
This question is inadequate on a number of levels.  While it does tie into connecting the 
child to living in the United States, that is a separate requirement apart from the residency 
requirement tying the taxpayer to living with the child,48 and it diverts attention from the 
                                                 
44 Nicole Duarte, Tighter Knowledge, Documentation Requirements Expected for EITC 
Claims, TAX NOTES, Sept. 9, 2008, LEXIS, 2008 TNT 176-4. 
45  A qualifying child is a child “who has the same principal place of abode as the 
taxpayer for more than one-half of such taxable year.”  I.R.C. § 152(c)(1)(B) (2006).    
Though a limited EITC is available for low wage workers between the ages of 25-64 who 
do not live with children, the presence of a qualifying child is a meaningful variable 
affecting both eligibility and amount of the EITC. I.R.C. § 32(c)(1). 
46 It is unclear, however, whether EITC errors are the result of actual failure to meet the 
residency requirement or an inability to provide adequate records to satisfy the 
requirement.  Regardless, the size of the problem warrants more of the preparer’s 
attention.  Janet Holtzblatt & Janet McCubbin, Whose Child is it Anyway? Simplifying the 
Definition of a Child, 61 Nat’l Tax J. 701, 712. 
47 IRS Form 8867. 
48 See I.R.C. § 32(c)(1)(D) (2006). 
 18
main issue at hand. Given the importance of residence to program error, the applicable 
form could specifically require the preparer to list the address (or addresses) of the 
children that the taxpayer has claimed throughout the year, with a specific notation in the 
form highlighting that this is an issue resulting in significant taxpayer error.  It could 
additionally ask if the preparer has viewed documentary evidence that lists the child or 
children’s address as an address that is consistent with information that the preparer has 
or knows about the taxpayer’s address. This will likely result in some additional time to 
complete the return, and it could potentially increase the preparation cost. However, 
listing addresses and tying those addresses to time periods should take no more than five 
minutes for most claimants and would further highlight the issue’s importance for both 
preparers and taxpayers. 
When it comes to other relatively unambiguous issues, like sole proprietor 
compliance, the tax system defaults to a "don’t ask, don’t tell" possibility, meaning that 
preparers can largely hide behind a veil of ignorance, avoid responsibility for any errors 
on a return that they prepare, and direct responsibility for misconduct to the taxpayers 
themselves.49  To avoid that default, Congress could consider expanding specific due 
diligence rules to other areas of systemic noncompliance, and the IRS should provide 
meaningful questions in tailored due diligence worksheets tied to a select few specific 
issues characteristic of both high preparer usage and high error rates. For example, for 
sole proprietors, a due diligence worksheet could specifically address questions regarding 
the different components of gross receipts, with the goal of ensuring that preparers ask 
                                                 
49 Morse et al., supra note 21, at 24-25. 
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sufficient questions so they can no longer safely hide behind the “don’t ask, don’t tell” 
wall that Morse identifies.50
In sum, the current rules emphasize that preparers have duties of further inquiry 
only in relation to specific information about a particular taxpayer. If, for example, the 
preparer has reason to believe the information is false, the preparer must ask further 
questions. I propose that Congress and the IRS heighten the preparer’s responsibilities in 
response to research that suggests there is systemic noncompliance with specific issues. 
Their doing so will reflect a more nimble approach to tax compliance, allow for tailored 
responsibilities that tie to specific systemic issues, and increase taxpayer and practitioner 
visibility and responsibility for presenting correct factual information on tax returns. 
 
2. The IRS Needs to Change the Norm of Ignoring the Due Diligence Rules  
 
In addition to the due diligence rules failing to meaningfully connect the 
preparer’s overall role in ensuring the integrity of our tax system, current research shows 
                                                 
50 See Morse, supra note 21, at 38 (putting additional disclosure obligations on preparers 
and sole proprietors themselves; for example, requiring sole proprietors and preparers to 
sign a statement that all reported income includes “all revenue, cash and otherwise, and 
that deductions are accurately reported”). See also The Cash Economy, in 2007 National 
Taxpayer Advocate 2007 Annual Report to Congress, supra note 20, at 35-65, at 40 
(proposing amending Schedule C to enable IRS to more easily match income reported on 
Schedule C with income reported on Form 1099). Note that recent legislation heightens 
the possibility that the IRS and preparers can monitor sole proprietors who appear to be 
reporting low levels of cash receipts.  Section 6050W provides new information reporting 
rules for third parties making reimbursements in settlement of reportable payment card 
transactions.  Under the new provision, banks and other entities obligated to reimburse 
merchants using electronic payment card mechanisms will need to provide information 
returns to the IRS as well as the merchants. See I.R.C. § 6050W, Emergency Economic 
Stabilization Act of 2008, P.L. 110-343 (2008). This will allow a relatively easy 
determination of the percentage of gross receipts that reflect these reportable payments. 
See The Cash Economy, supra, at 40. 
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those preparers often ignore the existing due diligence rules.51 The IRS must undertake a 
meaningful education and outreach program to clearly identify what its expectations are 
of preparers, to ensure that an increased use of due diligence is not met by a collective 
sigh or just the shuffling of additional pieces of paper. 
Consider the EITC due diligence requirements.52 The recent TIGTA mystery 
shopper scenario highlights the inconsistency and lack of compliance with respect to the 
information gathering process, even when there are fairly specific requirements 
associated with generating facts from clients.53 In that study, while preparing the tax 
returns, many of the preparers did solicit probing questions prior to and in the midst of 
the preparation process. To establish eligibility determinations in cases when the 
preparers did not ask probing questions, the preparers usually took one of two avenues: 
formulating assumptions or relying on tax return preparation software.  The preparers 
utilized numerous methodologies to obtain information from the mystery shoppers.  In 
just over half of the visits (16 of 28) the tax return preparers had the TIGTA auditors 
complete an information worksheet.  This information worksheet is used to collect data 
such as information regarding children that can be claimed as dependents or data 
concerning various sources of income.  Of the preparers that had the auditors complete an 
information worksheet, only five of 16 properly completed the tax returns.  The preparers 
in the remaining 11 visits merely asked for identification cards.  With respect to the 
                                                 
51 The National Taxpayer Advocate has noted the inadequacies of IRS efforts in 
collecting on penalties that have been assessed.  In calendar years 2001 and 2002, the IRS 
assessed $2.4 million in preparer penalties, but collected only $291,000 (12%) of those 
assessed penalties.   NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE 2003 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 
270. 
52 I.R.C. § 6695(g) (2006) (imposing $100 fine for each failure to meet EITC due 
diligence requirements). 
53 See generally TIGTA, UNENROLLED PREPARERS, supra note 5. 
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EITC, there was consistent noncompliance with the due diligence requirements. Although 
the seven EITC-return preparers did complete the required Paid Preparer’s Earned 
Income Credit Checklist,54 none of them asked all of the probing questions on the form. 
This ignoring of responsibilities likely occurs because there is no requirement for 
the preparer to sign the appropriate due diligence checklist and submit that checklist to 
either the IRS or the taxpayer,55 and the IRS has not meaningfully backstopped its 
requirements with enforcement.56  While the mystery shopper scenario described above 
is limited, my sense is that it is reflective of many unenrolled preparers, and that there is a 
norm of noncompliance with the current due-diligence regime.  If I am right, this 
suggests that the IRS will have significant (though not insurmountable) obstacles in 
getting preparers to comply with whatever additional requirements Congress and the IRS 
impose. Getting the IRS to ensure compliance with specific requirements imposed on 
preparers has as a prerequisite the agency’s ability to track and monitor preparers, so that 
the agency can properly educate preparers about their specific responsibilities and also 
meaningfully backstop education with enforcement in the face of continued 
noncompliance. The importance of tracking and monitoring preparers is addressed in 
Section III.A. 
 
3. The Next Steps with Due Diligence 
                                                 
54 IRS Form 8867. 
55 EITC preparers must complete an EITC checklist (Form 8867 or equivalent form), and 
complete the EITC worksheets in Forms 1040, 1040A, or 1040 EZ.  The preparers must 
also not have any knowledge of any of the information being incorrect, and must retain 
this information for three years after the filing date. Reg. § 1.6695-2;  Olson Hearing 
Testimony, supra note 17, at 6 nn.14-15; Book, Hybrid, supra note 35, at 1146. 
56 “[T]he IRS is virtually a nonexistent presence in the unenrolled preparer community.”  
Olson Hearing Testimony, supra note 17, at 6. 
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The premise behind the heightened approach to due diligence that I suggest 
derives from the principle that additional preparer obligations into inquiring about client 
facts should follow from IRS data that suggest there is systemic noncompliance with 
respect to a particular area or issue. The EITC rules reflect a nascent but ineffective effort 
in that direction.   
The government expects that preparers have a responsibility to the integrity of the 
tax system overall, in addition to serving their clients. The IRS and Congress should use 
the research which suggests that there is a significant usage of preparers in areas like the 
EITC and the reporting of sole proprietor income. This seems especially helpful for areas 
where there is relative legal clarity, and where taxpayers (or preparers) should not have 
varying risk tolerance or a strong appetite for challenging uncertain legal positions. After 
all, there is no uncertainty about the need to report gross income, and the presence of 
qualifying children does not generally involve issues subject to legal ambiguity.57  It does 
not implicate, for example, the situation under Section 6694 (prior to its 2008 amendment 
that repealed a heightened level of disclosure for undisclosed positions), when the fear 
was that preparers and taxpayers had varying standards of certainty to avoid penalties.58 
                                                 
57 Cf. Rowe v. Commissioner, 128 T.C. No. 3 (2007 ). In a deeply divided Tax Court 
opinion, the Court held that a taxpayer's incarceration should be treated as a "temporary" 
absence from the home and thus allowed her to satisfy the six-month residency 
requirement rule for purposes of treating the child as a qualifying child.  While Rowe 
does illustrate that legal ambiguity does exist in these areas, that is not the norm, nor does 
it  typify the relationship between preparer and taxpayer in this context. In contrast, with 
respect to many other areas of the tax law, there is a significant interaction between 
preparers and taxpayers revolving around acceptable reporting positions in light of the 
possibility of IRS challenge, for example, to the amount or existence of a deduction or 
loss. 
58 Richard Lipton, What Hath Congress Wrought?  Amended Section 6694 Will Cause 
Problems for Everyone, 107 J. Tax’n 68, 69-71 (2007). See P.L. 110-343, retroactively  
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When it comes to reporting gross income, or whether children lived with the claimant, 
there is not much in the way of legal wiggle room that potentially puts preparers and 
taxpayers at odds, and differing views of likelihood of success or risk tolerance should 
not create uncomfortable conflicts between the preparer and the taxpayer.  
While a heightened due-diligence regime might make some preparers 
uncomfortable, that discomfort should serve as a reminder that there are three parties at 
the table—the preparer, the taxpayer, and the IRS—and might serve to create or tip 
noncompliance norms that have settled in areas where taxpayers are used to misstating 
information to their preparers.59 To the extent there are conflicts between preparers and 
taxpayers,  they should  revolve around different views regarding the need to comply 
with the tax law. This proposal emphasizes the preparers’ obligation to inquire about 
relevant facts, and inform taxpayers about why those facts are relevant to complying with 
the laws, areas that should not legitimately heighten or create preparer tensions with 
clients. 
To be sure, any additional obligations the government imposes upon preparers 
create the possibility that taxpayers inclined to overstate credits or underreport income 
will turn away from preparers, and self-prepare returns, relying on increasingly user-
friendly software to enable or facilitate the misreporting, especially with respect to 
Schedule C income. This is admittedly a possibility, but, at a minimum, enhanced due 
diligence will limit the finger pointing and reduce the difficult problems of proof that the 
                                                                                                                                                 
eliminated  toughened standards and replaced it with an eased standard for returns 
prepared after May 25, 2007).  
 
59 See Leandra Lederman, The Interplay Between Norms and Enforcement in Tax 
Compliance, 64 Ohio St. L.J. 1453, 1503-13 (2004). 
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government faces when the taxpayer blames the preparer, and the preparer in turn blames 
the taxpayer for not telling the truth or for giving incomplete facts. In addition, if the IRS 
is tracking preparers (as I suggest below in section III.A) the IRS should be able to 
monitor trends and focus its compliance efforts on those who fail to use reputable return 
preparers with lower risk of noncompliance. 
 
III. VISIBILITY: TRACKING AND COMMUNICATING 
A. Tracking and Monitoring Preparer Performance 
As my initial report described, exactly what effect paid preparers have on tax 
compliance is not entirely clear.60  Despite the increasing use of preparers and an 
increased general sense that more research is needed to examine the role that preparers 
play,61 both TIGTA and  GAO have recently noted that the IRS is limited by the lack of 
information it captures about preparers, and the limited means of monitoring practitioner 
performance.  The lack of identifying information about preparers is a significant 
handicap that limits the ability of researchers and policymakers to fully evaluate the types 
of problems different kinds of preparers are creating, and hampers meaningful 
consideration of a number of important prescriptive policy proposals. 
                                                 
60 See Book, Role of Preparers, supra note 1, at 74; 2007 NTA Report, supra note 20, at 
95. 
61 See Eric Toder, What is the Tax Gap?, TAX NOTES, October 23, 2007, Lexis, 2007 
TNT 130-22 (“[A] key variable of interest would be relative compliance rates among 
taxpayers who prepare returns by hand, prepare returns with software, and use paid 
preparers.”). 
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According to TIGTA, “although paid preparers file the majority of income tax 
returns, the IRS has limited information on them and insufficient means by which to track 
or monitor them.”62 Likewise, GAO states that: 
IRS does little to monitor or track information about individual paid preparers. 
For example, IRS does not collect information on the type of preparers, such 
as whether the preparer is an enrolled agent or part of a commercial chain, or 
the number or types of returns filed by preparers.  Having such information 
could allow IRS to better identify filing errors and target its outreach to 
specific preparers or preparer groups.63
 
TIGTA similarly notes that, in the current environment, preparer identification is a 
hodgepodge: 
Preparers identify themselves on income tax returns they prepare by entering their 
Social Security Number, Employer Identification Number, or Practitioner Tax 
Identification Number.  A Practitioner Tax Identification Number is used by a 
preparer who does not want to disclose his or her Social Security Number on tax 
returns he or she prepares.  It is a nine-character alpha/numeric with the first 
character being “P” followed by eight numbers.  An Employer Identification 
Number is a unique nine-digit number used to identify a taxpayer’s business 
account on IRS records.64
 
Given the above, it is not surprising that the IRS has a difficult time in the current 
environment getting even a general read on the role that preparers play in taxpayer 
compliance decisions: 
The IRS does not have one list or database that collects information on preparers.  
For example, it does not have a list or database that shows the preparer’s name, 
associated identifying numbers, or whether the preparer is a practitioner or 
unenrolled preparer and/or an Electronic Return Originator.  Preparers could be 
self-employed and use their personal Employer Identification Number or 
employed and preparing tax returns as part of a tax preparation company.  In the 
                                                 
62 TIGTA, UNENROLLED PREPARERS, supra note 5, at 12. 
63 U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, TAX ADMINISTRATION: 2007 FILING 
SEASON CONTINUES TREND OF IMPROVEMENT, BUT OPPORTUNITIES TO REDUCE COSTS 
AND INCREASE TAX COMPLIANCE SHOULD BE EVALUATED 18, (GAO-08-38, Nov., 2007) 
[hereinafter GAO, 2007 FILING SEASON].  IRS is slowly awakening to the importance of 
tracking data relating to preparers. Id. 
64 TIGTA, UNENROLLED PREPARERS, supra note 5, at 12. 
 26
latter instance, the preparer could use the Employer Identification Number 
associated with the tax preparation company and his or her personal Social 
Security Number or Practitioner Tax Identification Number.65
 
In addition to these limitations, many practitioners fail to sign returns they prepare. While 
a preparer failing to sign a return can trigger a civil penalty, it does not trigger 
meaningful or systemic IRS enforcement; nor does it result in the IRS not processing 
these unsigned returns. As the GAO indicated, the IRS overlooks this because processing 
tax returns is a priority even if preparer information is not provided or is inaccurate.66
 In light of the above, TIGTA has recommended that the IRS develop and require 
a single identification number that that would facilitate controlling and monitoring paid 
preparers.67  GAO has also recommended that the IRS require preparers to use a single 
identification number to provide the IRS with the means to track preparer performance.68 
The IRS has indicated that it is studying the issue.69 I strongly support such a proposal, 
which would specifically require preparers to use a single preparer identification number, 
and I believe it will enable the IRS to educate and enforce in a much more systematic 
                                                 
65 Id. at 12-13 (internal footnotes omitted). While the IRS does maintain a database of 
enrolled agents, the database is of limited use because enrolled agents are allowed to use 
a Practitioner Tax Identification Number, Social Security Number, or Centralized 
Authorization File number.  With multiple identifying numbers in the database, the IRS 
has not been able to determine this population with reasonable certainty. Id. at 13-14. 
66 For example, limited tests showed that more than 9,000 preparers used their Employer 
Identification Numbers as Social Security Numbers to prepare more than 500,000 tax 
returns filed in Calendar Year 2008, thus creating additional challenges.  TIGTA, 
LIMITED SAMPLE, at 12-14. These variables make it difficult not only to identify the 
number of preparers but also to identify all the tax returns they prepared. GOVERNMENT 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, FISCAL YEAR 2009 BUDGET REQUEST AND INTERIM 
PERFORMANCE RESULTS OF IRS’S 2008 FILING SEASON 5 (GAO-08-567, Mar., 2008) 
[hereinafter GAO, FY2009 BUDGET]. 
67 TIGTA, UNENROLLED PREPARERS, supra note 5, at 14. 
68 GAO, FY2009 BUDGET, supra note 66, at 6. 
69 TIGTA, UNENROLLED PREPARERS, supra note 5, at 15. 
 27
manner as well as make preparers more transparent players in the tax compliance 
decision.70
B. Keeping Preparers Visible 
Research strongly suggests that the presence of information returns has a 
significant effect on tax compliance. In fact, recent tax gap data show that compliance 
among items disclosed to the IRS, even if not backstopped by withholding, leads to close 
to 95% compliance.71 The importance of injecting additional visibility into the areas of 
systemic noncompliance has recently received significant attention, especially with 
respect to the possibility of increasing information reporting to service recipients and 
increasing the obligations with respect to reporting the basis in transactions involving the 
sale of securities. 
At present, preparers are largely invisible from the process, with no systematic 
means available for the IRS to track preparer-generated returns.72 Research has suggested 
                                                 
70 One possibility is that IRS could create a preparer database that allows the IRS to 
capture compliance related information on each preparer, including, for example, the total 
number of clients and dollars a preparer has in the cash economy, and information on 
client return DIF scores that are outside the norm, math error activity on client returns, 
and examination results. Where a preparer is a member of a firm, that relationship  
presents the possibility of two different perspectives, one at the preparer level, and the 
other at the firm level, provided both the preparer  and the firm can both be uniquely 
identified.  
71 Leandra Lederman, Reducing Information Gaps to Reduce the Tax Gap 6 (2008) 
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author).See IRS News Release 2006-28, IRS 
Updates Tax Gap Estimates (Feb. 14, 2006) (accompanying charts). 
72 For instance, working with researchers from TAS, I attempted to determine a 
breakdown of compliance estimates by types of preparers, considering the number of 
returns prepared by these preparers.  In this report, a significant portion of practitioners 
were labeled “Unclassifiable.”  These unclassifiable preparers constitute just shy of 45% 
of all paid preparers, and prepare over 13% of practitioner-prepared returns.  
(Unpublished IRS data on Compliance Analysis by Activity Code and Preparer 
Classification for Tax Year 2006 (2008)).  TIGTA has also noted that the IRS does not 
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that part of the reason why information reporting is successful for taxpayers is that 
taxpayers overestimate the possibility that the IRS will detect noncompliance when 
information is reported to the IRS.73 Precisely the opposite scenario exists for preparers, 
who operate largely on the basis that their actions are immune and invisible.  
Unlike taxpayers, preparers—especially those not governed by Treasury Circular 
230—exist in a regime largely outside IRS visibility. 74  As I suggest below, a necessary 
condition to any increased reliance on preparers to positively influence taxpayer 
compliance decisions is changing that equation, and letting preparers know that the IRS is 
aware of their actions. For example, IRS outreach to preparers should be systematic and 
reflective of information that relates to the returns those preparers generate. With the 
increased usage of e-filing, and the possibility that even the IRS can scan or use bar-code 
data to enter information from paper-filed returns,75 IRS should connect trends in those 
returns or potential disparities that highlight IRS knowledge. As a contrast, tax 
preparation software can tell taxpayers average amounts of charitable contributions, 
which can fuel taxpayer compliance decisions, but IRS too could connect data from 
                                                                                                                                                 
have one list or database where information on paid preparers can be compiled.  TIGTA, 
UNENROLLED PREPARERS, supra note 5, at 12.  
73 Lederman, supra note 71, at 6-7.   
74 For example, in my focus group research, a number of practitioners specifically 
mentioned the IRS’s lack of effort to focus on improper preparer conduct as a reason for 
the continued presence improper return preparer conduct.  See Book, Focus Group, 
supra, note 36.  The National Taxpayer Advocate has noted on several occasion the 
serious need to understand the role that preparers play in taxpayer compliance decisions 
and the causes of preparer errors.  See, e.g., Nat’l Taxpayer Advocate Fiscal Year 2009 
Objectives 50-51; Nat’l Taxpayer Advocate Fiscal Year 2008 Objectives 57 (June 30, 
2007). 
75 See GAO, 2007 FILING SEASON, supra note 63, at 3 (“Although IRS has done some 
research on bar coding and full transcription, it does not know the actions needed to 
require commercial software vendors to include bar codes on printed returns . . .”); see 
also Joab Jackson, IRS Tests 2-D Bar Codes for Scanning E-Forms, GOV’T COMPUTER 
NEWS, May 3, 2004. 
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specific preparer-generated returns that are different from the norm or suggestive of 
errors.  If, for example, one preparer’s EITC returns reflect a significantly higher median 
refund or a particularly high percentage of Schedule C income rather than wage income, 
IRS could contact those preparers quickly with letters alerting them that IRS has noticed 
information that differs from the norm.  There may be legitimate reasons for that 
difference. Now, this would only be helpful in the long run if the IRS connected these 
data to the possibility of audit if the data continue to suggest discrepancies, but it could 
also provide the possibility for preparer self-correction, without the immediate, heavy-
handed, command-and-control approach typically associated with tax compliance.  
Ultimately, IRS can ratchet up the pressure if preparers seem to ignore the IRS-generated 
information. 
 The prospect of data-driven increased visibility of preparer conduct is discussed 
further below in Section V discussing responsive regulation, when I consider the 
theoretical context of a more multi-faceted approach to interacting with preparers. While 
to some, it may smack of Big Brother, with IRS capturing data and quickly touching 
preparers in a “soft” way if the data reflect variations from the norm—like a high 
percentage of expenses to profits on preparer-generated Schedule C returns, or a low 
percentage of cash receipts to credit card receipts on a modified Schedule C that would 
impose additional visibility requirements76— this could also tie in to the increased due 
diligence requirements (discussed above in section IIB) and allow the IRS to provide 
useful information to preparers to help them assist taxpayers with complying. 
                                                 
76 See 2007 NTA Report, supra note 20, at 40 (recommending that a revised Schedule C 
form be issued to “break out income not reported on information returns”). See also 
I.R.C. § 6050W (2006). 
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 1. The Importance of Targeting New Preparers 
 The IRS, with the legislative registration and certification initiative facilitating the 
contact discussed below at Part IV, must affirmatively and promptly reach out to 
practitioners as they enter the tax profession. Habits start early, and research and intuition 
suggest that both practitioners and taxpayers themselves can become habitually 
noncompliant.77 This early communication will accomplish a number of important 
objectives. It will let the practitioners know that the IRS is there as a resource to help 
practitioners understand the law so that they can apply the proper rules to their clients’ 
situations. It will also help set compliance expectations, and allow the IRS to target 
information to specific types of returns that the preparer is preparing, and perhaps 
leverage the role that preparers can (and do) play in educating taxpayers about their rights 
and responsibilities.  
Some recent information suggests that the IRS is striving to identify and target 
preparers who are new. Promising signs include the government reaching out in writing 
to first time EITC preparers, including providing a list of common errors, preparer due 
diligence requirements and where preparers can turn if they need help.78 This targeting 
acknowledges the significant differences that comprise the tax gap, and ties in to the need 
to foster acceptable practices at an early stage. 
                                                 
77 Kidder & McEwen, supra note 6. 
78 EITC: Due Diligence is More Than a Check Mark on a Form or Clicking Through Tax 
Preparation Software, IRS Pub. 4687 (Revised June, 2008) (explaining due diligence 
requirements for paid practitioners); Leslie Book, Draft Form (unpublished work, on file 
with author). 
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The IRS can take similar steps with new practitioners who prepare returns for sole 
proprietors, particularly those sole proprietors who have recently started their businesses.  
Erich Kirchler theorized that sole proprietor noncompliance is largely the result of a 
perceived loss of freedom in paying taxes.79  Entrepreneurs who have taken on the risk of 
creating their own businesses, by their very nature are likely more independent, and are 
thus more likely to perceive taxes as an unjustified taking of their hard-earned income.80  
According to Kirchler, this perceived loss of freedom drives a reactance motive among 
sole proprietors to evade their taxes.81
Kirchler’s research suggests that this resistance is related in part to the length of 
time that the proprietor has been in business.82  Over time, the entrepreneur’s 
expectations include an awareness of the tax system and the individual’s obligations 
within that system, and they are more likely to take taxes into account in their business 
operation.83  Newer entrepreneurs also seem to lack the skills, knowledge, and experience 
with taxes that allow them to comply even if they do not share or act upon the perceived 
lack of freedom.84  As the business becomes better established, the entrepreneur is less 
likely to perceive taxes as a loss of their income and freedom and more likely to become 
                                                 
79 See Erich Kirchler, The Economic Psychology of Tax Behaviour 156 (Cambridge 
Univ. Press) (2007). 
80 Id. 
81 Id. at 157. 
82 Id. (“Length of running a business determines perceived restriction of one’s freedom 
and reactance motives and intention to evade taxes.”). 
83 See id. at 157-58 (“Over time, adaption to the tax system as well as a separation of 
gross income from net income and taxes into separate accounts are likely to occur.” 
(internal citations omitted)). 
84 Id. at 166. 
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more familiar with procedural requirements (including substantiation and recordkeeping), 
which increases tax compliance among these sole proprietors.85
One implication of Kirchler’s research is that return preparers, with IRS help, can 
educate sole proprietors as to the importance of tax compliance and the means to do so.86  
A sole proprietor may have limited understanding of what his obligations are, and may 
think (rightly or wrongly) that others in his business are not complying with their tax 
obligations. To the extent that there is a continued pattern of underreporting in an 
industry or community, the preparer has an uphill struggle to convince or influence the 
taxpayer to adopt more positive behavior. This is still a useful avenue for IRS 
involvement, though, especially if there is a broad-based approach to reducing the 
systemic noncompliance through other measures.  
2. Persuasive Communication 
 Effective communication between the IRS and the practitioner is essential to 
encouraging preparer compliance in areas of systemic noncompliance.  While there have 
been several studies focusing on the effect that persuasive communications have on 
encouraging tax compliance, two more recent studies—one conducted in Minnesota,87 
                                                 
85 Id. 
86 Cf. id. at 189 (“It is important to take into account that the perception of taxpayers and 
the resulting style of interaction determine the relationship between tax authorities and 
taxpayers.”). 
87 In the Minnesota study, the Minnesota Department of Revenue decided to look into the 
impact that “moral persuasion communications” had on compliance.  In this experiment, 
two groups of randomly selected taxpayers each received a certain treatment letter: one 
group receiving letters appealing to the taxpayer’s conscience, and the other group 
receiving letters discrediting the notion that there is widespread noncompliance.  The set 
of letters appealing to the taxpayer’s conscience (“conscience letters”) included a 
reminder that “when taxpayers do not pay what they owe, the entire community suffers.”  
The compliant majority letters sought to drive home the notion that “if one wanted to 
belong to the majority community of citizens one should comply with the tax laws.”   
 33
the other in the UK88—provide insight into how the IRS can tailor its communications 
with paid preparers to most effectively encourage paid preparer compliance. 
                                                                                                                                                 
The researchers then compared reported income and taxes paid for the recipients 
of the letters from tax years 1993 and 1994.  While income reported and taxes paid by 
those who received the letter did increase after the letters were sent out, the increases 
were statistically insignificant when compared to a control group.  This led the 
researchers to conclude that neither of the two approaches affected aggregate compliance, 
though they did add a caveat that similar appeals delivered in a different way, more 
frequently, or communications of a different sort might have an effect on compliance.  
See generally Marsha Blumenthal et al., Do Normative Appeals Affect Tax Compliance?  
Evidence from a Controlled Experiment in Minnesota, 54 Nat’l Tax J. 125 (2001). 
88 In this study, the Inland Revenue (UK’s IRS equivalent) sent out five different letters 
to five different sets of sole proprietors, the contents of which ranged from simply 
offering assistance in filing an accurate return to notification of a preselected audit.  The 
five letters were characterized as: 
 
1. Enabling—offering advice and support in filing an accurate return; 
2. Citizenship—containing both an element of the “conscience” and “compliant 
majority” letters from the Minnesota study; 
3. Increased audit—notifying the taxpayer that there will be an increased number of 
audits of sole proprietor returns in the upcoming year; 
4. Audit/penalties—notifying the taxpayer of an increase in the number of audits in 
the upcoming year while including a statement on penalties saying, “If we find 
that a return is incorrect, we may charge financial penalties as well as collect any 
unpaid tax”; and 
5. Preselected audit—notifying the taxpayer of an increase in the number of audits in 
the upcoming year, and stating that the recipient has been preselected for an audit. 
 
In the UK, sole proprietors who have annual turnover (sales) of less than £15,000 
may file a simplified tax form, while those with annual turnover above £15,000 have 
much more stringent reporting requirements.  This threshold plays a key role in proprietor 
compliance, as the increased compliance costs may provide an incentive to underreport 
turnover so they may file the simplified form.  The researchers discovered that all of the 
groups had a higher proportion of sole proprietors claiming turnover above £15,000 than 
a control group, with the exception of those who had received the most benign letters. 
This, along with similar results for reported net income, led them to conclude that 
sanction-based letters could be an effective tool in increasing compliance among those 
sole proprietors who self-prepare their returns, though effectiveness over the long-term 
would require a significant amount of resources to follow up with increased and targeted 
audits.  Similar results and conclusions were reached among those who used paid 
preparers, though unlike those who self-prepare, letters that emphasized “being a good 
citizen” seemed to result in a notable increase in reported net profits. 
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 These two studies provide some insight into how targeted appeals to taxpayers 
may affect tax compliance generally.  An interesting idea that can be gleaned from these 
studies, particularly the UK study, is that compliance may be affected by something as 
simple as how the tax agency presents itself to the taxpayers.  From the UK study, the 
letters that showed a greater involvement in the tax collection process, and a greater 
awareness of the goings-on in return preparation were met with a more substantial 
response by the taxpayers.  As the agency presented itself as more in-tune with the 
facts—or at least more willing to learn the facts—the more compliant the people that 
were contacted became.  In response to the letters where the agency presented itself as a 
more passive body, simply waiting for the taxpayer to solicit their help, there was no 
change in taxpayer behavior.  As the letters grew “tougher,” and presented a greater 
involvement and a greater understanding of the collection process, the taxpayers 
responded by becoming more and more compliant—or at least more cautious in their 
reporting. 
While both of these studies focused on the effect of persuasive communication on 
the taxpayer, they do provide some insight to how a future study that focuses on preparers 
can be conducted.  It would be interesting to see how similar letters would affect preparer 
action.  If, for instance the IRS were to send letters to paid preparers, the IRS would be 
able to track how preparers respond to offers of assistance, appeals to conscience, 
notification of areas of systemic noncompliance, and threats of guaranteed audits. 
                                                                                                                                                 
See generally John Hasseldine et al., Persuasive Communications: Tax Compliance 
Enforcement Strategies for Sole Proprietors, 24 Contemporary Accounting Research 171 
(2007). 
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This type of study would provide insight into the source of noncompliance.  
Consider the following: Will the sanction-based letters drive Type 2 preparers to become 
Type 3 preparers?  Can the letters influence Type 1 preparers to change their ways?  
Insight into these questions will serve to illustrate where the IRS should focus its research 
and enforcement resources. 
To be sure, this information, however, would only get the IRS so far.  This 
information would have to be analyzed in conjunction with qualitative research (for 
example, through mystery shopper scenarios discussed below) that considers the dynamic 
relationship between the preparer and the taxpayer.  It is unclear to what degree honest 
and diligent preparers who are intent on reporting their clients’ tax information correctly 
(Type 3 preparers) can influence taxpayer compliance decisions when those taxpayers are 
intent on underreporting.  If the taxpayers are responsive to practitioner efforts at 
compliance, then this could animate the need to focus our efforts to encourage preparers 
to change.  If the taxpayer is not responsive to practitioners pushing them towards 
compliance, then that will open up an avenue for further inquiry and research. 
 
3. Refining the Understanding of the Relationship Between Preparers and Taxpayers 
 
In my initial report, I suggested that the IRS should further study the interaction 
between preparers and taxpayers, with an eye toward examining the effect (i) that 
preparers can have on taxpayers’ compliance decisions, and (ii) that different types of 
taxpayers reflecting different factual circumstances or motivations can have on preparer 
conduct.89  Along these same lines, I emphasized that the IRS would learn a great deal 
                                                 
89 Book, Role of Preparers, supra note 1, at 51. 
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about possible solutions to the tax gap by exploring the relationship between taxpayers 
and preparers, specifically focusing on the way that certain types of preparers interact 
with taxpayers who present different characteristics. Some qualitative and quantitative 
research appears to suggest that Type 1 taxpayers seem to seek out Type 1 preparers.90 
Others have likewise emphasized that given the important role that preparers play, 
researchers and tax administrations should pay more attention to actual interactions 
between taxpayers and practitioners.91  
Recent mystery shopper scenarios conducted by both TIGTA92 and GAO93 
suggest that errors in the EITC and reporting sole proprietor income associated with 
                                                 
90 As mentioned above, taxpayers likely present themselves to preparers in one of three 
ways: 
1. They are intent on understating their liabilities or overclaiming refunds (Type 1 
taxpayers); 
2. They are indifferent about understating their liabilities or overclaiming their 
refunds (Type 2 taxpayers)—these taxpayers will likely defer to the practitioner’s 
advice; or 
3. They seek assistance in preparing their returns correctly (Type 3 taxpayers). 
 
And the preparers likely act in one of three different ways: 
1. They are intent on helping clients understate their liabilities or overclaim refunds 
(Type 1 preparers); 
2. They are indifferent about whether their client complies with their tax reporting or 
refund claims (Type 2 preparers); or 
3. They are intent on ensuring that clients properly report their liabilities or claim 
their refunds (Type 3 preparers). 
 
See Karlinsky & Bankman, supra note 25; Albert et al., supra note 12.  For the typology 
of preparer and taxpayer types, see supra notes 28-29 and applicable text. 
91 Margaret McKerchar, Why Do Taxpayers Comply?  Past Lessons and Future 
Directions in Developing a Model of Compliance Behaviour, in TAX ADMINISTRATION IN 
THE 21ST CENTURY 225, 241 (Michael Walpole & Chris Evans eds., 2001) (emphasizing 
the importance of identifying various typologies of noncompliance and urging that 
additional studies be made relating to actual taxpayer and preparer behavior). 
92 See generally TIGTA, UNENROLLED PREPARERS, supra note 5. 
93 See generally GAO, LIMITED STUDY, supra note 4. 
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preparers reflect both willful and negligent conduct.94 In my prior report, and in prior 
research, I have argued that delving deeper into the underlying reasons of why a 
particular practitioner prepares an erroneous tax return is a helpful tool for policymakers 
wishing to understand what (if any) administrative or legislative efforts can assist in 
reducing the error rate among those returns. To that end, I suggest the following 
nonexclusive reasons for errors among preparer generated returns with respect to the 
reporting of sole proprietor income and the EITC: 
1. Ignorance or misunderstanding of the law – poor training, inadequate attention to 
changes in the law, or complexity of the law; 
2. Misunderstanding or failure to understand or learn the facts – due to language or 
cultural barriers – can also be related to ignorance or understanding of the law, as 
the practitioner may not know what information is relevant; 
3. Inability or unwillingness to detect false or incorrect information, though the 
inability or unwillingness or inability is not reflective of failing to exercise due 
diligence; 
4. Facilitate noncompliance by not exercising appropriate due diligence to verify 
facts or information; 
5. Aid and abet in noncompliance by advising taxpayers how to misstate or omit 
income, or claim inappropriate or excessive deductions or credits; 
6. Facilitate continued noncompliance by advising taxpayers how to arrange affairs 
to minimize chances of detection, including advising taxpayers on practices or 
positions that are likely to otherwise generate IRS attention; 
7. Directed noncompliance – working in an environment where there is a culture of 
noncompliance, either through insufficient quality control or active and 
affirmative exhortations to take affirmative steps which are meant to minimize 
liabilities or maximize refunds.95 
 
I believe this typology to be of use in areas reflective of systemic noncompliance, 
especially when the errors do not relate to legally ambiguous items—an area prior 
                                                 
94 For example, a recent TIGTA study which examined 28 tax returns prepared by 
unlicensed and unenrolled preparers at 12 commercial chain and 16 small, independently 
owned, tax return preparation offices.  TIGTA found that “of the 17 tax returns prepared 
incorrectly, 11 (65 percent) contained mistakes and omissions we considered to have 
been caused by human error and/or misinterpretation of the tax laws.  However, 6 (35 
percent) of the 17 returns contained misstatements and omissions we considered to have 
been willful or reckless.”  TIGTA, UNENROLLED PREPARERS, supra note 5. 
95 Book, Role of Preparers, supra note 1, at 69-70. 
 38
research has identified as being likely to generate a high degree of preparer-facilitated 
ambiguity exploiting.96 As I indicate in this and my prior report, the high error rates 
among paid preparer returns for issues like the EITC suggest, at a minimum, the need for 
a deeper inquiry into the relationship between preparers and the incorrect filing, and the 
possibility that preparers can steer taxpayers toward compliance,97 rather than the 
taxpayer choosing other more willing preparers or continuing to file  erroneously without 
the use of a preparer. 
The mystery shopper methodology is one tool that the IRS should explore 
expanding and improving to generate information that will provide additional insights 
into the reasons for the high incidence of errors on preparer-generated returns.98 As I 
mentioned above, recent mystery shopper scenarios suggest that there are both willful 
errors and other errors based on incompetence. I believe that the IRS should, in a robust 
manner, inquire into this relationship to explore more deeply the reasons behind the 
willful or incompetent conduct. The recent mystery shopper tests conducted by TIGTA 
                                                 
96 Id. at 63. 
97 It is possible that, irrespective of efforts to improve the competence or scruples of 
preparers, taxpayers intent on underreporting income or overclaiming credits will seek 
out other accommodating preparers or choose to prepare their own incorrect returns. This 
is discussed above in connection with reforming preparer due diligence requirements. See 
supra section II. To the extent the IRS will be better able to capture data relating to 
preparers, it is possible that education or audit selection criteria will reflect these possible 
shifts to other preparers, and allow a more targeted government response directed at those 
preparers and their clients. To the extent that there is an increase in noncompliance 
among self-prepared returns, this could likewise drive IRS education efforts and 
compliance resources. Thus, even if there is not a direct effect on changing taxpayer 
behavior, these changes should allow the IRS to better target its efforts.  
98 Other qualitative means to generate information include case studies, personal 
experience, focus groups, interviews, and participant observation.  Kidder and McEwen 
have actually suggested that researchers spend time as assistants to practitioners or take  
temporary jobs at a national chain in order to better observe and better understand the 
role of practitioners.  Kidder & McEwen, supra note 6, at 69. 
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and GAO provide a framework for the research, but the tests are geographically limited 
and fail to sufficiently isolate differences among preparer and taxpayer characteristics, 
making it difficult to take away more than just an anecdotal feel for the problems 
associated with the returns, and limiting the prescriptive value of the tests.99   
To make the mystery shopper approach more useful and informative, research that 
uses the mystery shopper methodology should have the following characteristics: 
• Future tests should work backwards from the noncompliance hypothesis the IRS 
wishes to consider to specific attributes that may contribute to noncompliance; 
• The test design should consider more rigorously the population of preparers that 
the IRS wishes to assess, with a close consideration of the hypothesis and specific 
attributes aiding in the selection of the target preparers; 
• Future tests should limit the number of different auditors conducting the test  to 
minimize the likelihood that tester differences account for preparer variations; 
• Future tests should allow for the actual filing of a tax return to better correlate 
testing with actual experiences; and 
• The tester should have a worksheet following the interaction to allow the tester to 
identify the likely reasons for the preparer’s conduct, with the worksheet (i) 
mirroring the reasons that may contribute to noncompliance (and allowing for 
other explanations to provide additional possible insight) and (ii) providing an 
opportunity for the tester to gauge the relative strength of a reason or reasons to 




For example, consider that the research sought to explore what circumstances 
suggest preparer incompetence as a reason for the presence of errors on tax returns 
claiming the EITC.  To start, the research should target the strata of preparers that one 
wishes to assess.  If the focus is on considering the differences between the various 
preparers, research could reflect the wide universe of the preparers who engage in EITC 
                                                 
99 The author is grateful for the advice of Jack Pund, Managing Director of JLP & 
Associates LLC, whose expertise in fraud investigations and forensic accounting 
provided valuable insights for this paper. 
 40
preparation (including enrolled versus unenrolled preparers), or closely target differences 
within a subset of preparers, such as franchise versus company-owned national-chain 
preparers. This selection will depend, in part, on what information the research is trying 
to generate. For example, it would be interesting and informative to test whether there 
may be a differing emphasis that corporate-owned stores place on training and quality 
control as compared with franchise-run outlets. A properly designed mystery shopper 
scenario can illustrate differences in competence between the two types of national-chain 
offices. It might also consider other variables, including, for example, the length of time a 
respective franchise store has been in business. The researcher should create a script that 
injects a degree of legal complexity into the scenario, to allow for the tester to consider 
varying levels of expertise. For example, as the residency requirement and filing status 
are two important areas contributing to errors, a scenario should closely mirror legal 
issues implicated in those issues.100  
Crucially, in light of possible errors that the tester detects in the return that a 
preparer is generating, the tester should be prepared to ask uniform follow-up questions 
reflective of a desire to understand why the preparer has offered incorrect return-
preparation advice, to allow a greater likelihood for the research to yield tangible and 
measurable results. For example, some evidence suggests that preparers facilitate 
taxpayer errors on the EITC out of sympathy for taxpayer circumstances, and a taxpayer 
who presents information that is close to eligibility might generate a preparer response 
that elicits that sympathy (e.g., a taxpayer who lives with a child for less than six months 
                                                 
100 With residency, for example, the tester could implicate temporary absences as well as 
the more straightforward test as to whether the child lived with the taxpayer for more 
than six months. 
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but who has demonstrated attachment to that child). Alternatively, the preparer may 
generate an incorrect return in this circumstance because he feels that the erroneous 
position is likely not to be detected, and even if it were, would likely not produce any 
tangible negative consequences for the preparer. Faced with those circumstances, a 
preparer may generate an incorrect return without even discussing the scenario with the 
taxpayer.  Without appropriate follow up, it may be difficult to determine what the 
preparer’s motives are, or why the return is not properly prepared.101 A return reflective 
of a lack of awareness with the legal rules warrants a different response when compared 
with a preparer whose error relates to sympathetic concern with the taxpayer’s 
circumstances, and could animate IRS education or more invasive compliance efforts. 
Follow-up studies that revolve around the same basic fact pattern and general 
strata of preparers visited, using a similarly trained tester who understands the scenario 
and goals of the inquiry could then add to the initial study with the presence of additional 
variables. For example, injecting the possibility of a refund product like a refund 
anticipation loan (RAL) would allow researchers to see how this variable might affect 
preparer interaction, considering, in particular, how preparers interact with taxpayers who 
begin with the stated objective of seeking a refund product, and alerting the preparer of 
the presence of additional potential profit from the transaction. may motivate preparers to 
act improperly. 102  
                                                 
101 For example, a tester should be prepared to ask the preparer follow up questions, like 
“what is the test to claim a child for this credit—I thought it was six months” or if the 
preparer generates a correct return, allow the tester to push on the preparer’s sympathy to 
determine if the preparer would be willing to bend to taxpayer preferences. 
102 It would be relatively easy to consider preparer reaction to the presence of income that 
the tester has received in a given year that is not subject to information reporting, to 
determine how a preparer’s attitude to such casual income might affect taxpayer 
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4. Preparer Reaction to Taxpayers’ Express Desire to Underreport Income or Claim 
Inappropriate or Excess Credits or Deductions 
One other interesting avenue for research is to consider preparer response to 
taxpayers who approach a preparer with the expressed intent of underreporting income or 
overclaiming deductions or credits. I believe taxpayer conduct falls along a spectrum 
from most desiring to underreport income and seek active preparer facilitation to enable 
the deception on one side, to the presenting of information which should engender 
questions in light of the preparer’s due diligence obligations on the other.103 Thus, a 
possibility for the mystery shopper approach is to consider how preparers react in the face 
of express taxpayer desire to underreport income or overclaim deductions or credits. 
Limited current qualitative research suggests that with respect to sole proprietor 
reporting, for example, there frequently is likely a taxpayer driven search for 
accommodating preparers, with taxpayers inclined to underreport searching out either 
Type 1 or Type 2 preparers.  It would be possible to try to gauge preparer reaction to 
taxpayers seeking to underreport or overclaim, and to try to determine to what extent 
                                                                                                                                                 
compliance decisions. TIGTA and GAO mystery shopper scenarios accounted for this.  
TIGTA, UNENROLLED PREPARERS, supra note 5, at 8; GAO, LIMITED STUDY, supra note 
4, at 19-20. This is particularly significant, as IRS and Treasury have questioned whether 
the additional profits associated with the offering of products like RALs, refund 
anticipation checks, or audit insurance. See Guidance Regarding Marketing of Refund Anticipation 
Loans, 73 Fed. Reg. 1131 (Jan. 8, 2008) 
103 As I discuss above, I believe that prepares should have heightened due diligence 
obligations when it comes to the reporting of sole proprietor income, given the research 
reflecting that there is systemic underreporting in this area, evidence that taxpayers are 
failing to provide sufficient information to preparers to enable the preparers to prepare a 
correct tax return, and the possibility that asking additional questions or requiring 
additional documentary proof from the taxpayer will materially limit the taxpayer’s 
possibility to keep his deception undetected.  The use of additional qualitative research 
can enable researchers to determine the compliance with preparers’ due diligence 
obligations. See TIGTA, UNENROLLED PREPARERS, supra note 5 (showing preparer 
disregard for the EITC due diligence rules). 
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preparers are willing to facilitate the noncompliance or turn a blind eye, or attempt to 
convince taxpayers to comply with their responsibilities. As noted above, the 
characteristics of the preparer willing to facilitate the misconduct or turn a blind eye to it 
would assist the IRS in identifying preparers who are not acting in accord with their 
overall obligations to the tax system’s integrity. 
To assist the research, I have refined the general three-pronged category of 
preparer classification and hypothesized that preparers respond to taxpayers who wish to 
understate their tax liability in one of six ways: 
1. Refusing practitioners – these practitioners refuse to engage in a relationship with 
clients they suspect to be dishonest or overly aggressive; 
2. Signaling practitioners – these practitioners will signal their unwillingness to 
prepare returns for clients they expect to be dishonest by making detailed 
inquiries or requesting back-up documentation; 
3. Facilitating practitioners – these preparers facilitate noncompliance by advising 
the taxpayer how to take improper return positions when they know or reasonably 
believe that the taxpayer is misstating facts; 
4. Indifferent practitioners – these preparers are indifferent to the taxpayer’s conduct 
and are willing to follow taxpayer preference and overlook noncompliance; 
5. Incompetent or unsophisticated practitioners – given the due diligence 
requirements, these preparers should be able to recognize that the taxpayer is 
taking improper positions, but are unable to detect or suspect taxpayer misconduct 
because of lack of training, education sophistication, etc.; and 
6. Reasonably unknowing practitioners – despite the client’s misconduct, the 
practitioner does not and cannot reasonably know or suspect that the facts the 
taxpayer alleges are incorrect.104 
 
One assumption I have made in this report is that the relationship between the 
preparer and the taxpayer is dynamic, and while the mystery shopper scenarios do not 
reflect actual taxpayer reaction (after all, the taxpayer in my scenario will be a tester 
rather than an actual taxpayer), they can gauge the approach that the preparer is willing to 
take to steer the taxpayer toward compliance or noncompliance. This could provide 
                                                 
104 Book, Role of Preparers, supra note 1, at 71. 
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insight into whether the above reasons are illustrative of preparer conduct in the face of 
taxpayer desire to underreport income or overclaim deductions or credits.  
Given the limitations of the research, it will not demonstrate the effect of preparer 
conduct determinatively, as it is possible that, in a genuine preparer-taxpayer interaction, 
a preparer will have no measurable ability to change the behavior of someone intent in 
underreporting or overclaiming. I believe, however, that at least at the margins, preparers 
can influence and educate taxpayers about compliance,105 and steer taxpayers towards 
complying with their responsibilities. Accordingly, gauging and evaluating the 
characteristics of preparers who reflect an awareness of their responsibility to the 
system’s integrity is important.  
As I mention above, I do not believe, however, that changing taxpayer behavior 
when there appears to be a norm of noncompliance will be easy, nor will such behavioral 
changes be accomplished solely through efforts directed at the preparer. My hope is that 
the IRS will enhance its understanding and views of preparers in this context as part of its 
overall strategy to reduce the tax gap and better educate preparers about their obligations 
and the government’s expectations of their conduct in an effort to reduce the tax gap.  
 
IV. REGISTERING AND TESTING PAID PREPARERS 
 
As mentioned in my initial report, there are no federal registration, certification, 
education, or testing (RCET) requirements that apply to all paid preparers. For over thirty 
years there have been calls for increased regulation of all return preparers, including 
imposing federal RCET requirements for those currently not governed by Treasury 
                                                 
105 See id. at 57-63.  Admittedly, more research is needed in this field. 
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Circular 230.106 There is renewed interest in such proposals, in part due to the National 
Taxpayer Advocate’s emphasis on the proposal in Reports to Congress,107 testimony 
favoring such a regime,108 proposed legislation that would provide for preparer 
registration,109 and the experiences of Oregon and California, two states that have had 
regulatory regimes applying to paid return preparers since the 1970s.110   
One common criticism of the possibility of requiring federal RCET requirements 
has been the absence of data relating to the Oregon and California programs.111 It is 
likely that this interest will increase given a recent GAO study that looked at the Oregon 
and California regulatory regimes, and found that Oregon’s paid-preparer individual-
income tax returns were more accurate than the national average.112 The extent of the 
                                                 
106 There have been calls to more closely regulate tax preparers since 1972, when the 
National Society of Accountants submitted an eight-point plan focusing on registering 
paid preparers.  The issue gained new life in 1989, and again in 1994-95, when the IRS 
Commissioner’s Advisory Group studied the issue and suggested registering and 
monitoring preparers.  Most recently, in 2003, Senator Bingaman of New Mexico 
introduced the Low Income Taxpayer Protection Act of 2003 calling for registering paid 
preparers and RAL providers.  See Bauman and Matzke, supra note 14. 
107 See National Taxpayer Advocate 2002 Annual Report to Congress 216, Regulation of 
Federal Tax Return Preparers,; National Taxpayer Advocate 2003 Annual Report to 
Congress, 270, (proposing strengthening regulations on paid preparers). 
108 See Fraud in Income Tax Return Preparation: Hearing Before H. Comm. on Ways 
and Means, 109th Cong. 7 (statement of Nina Olson, National Taxpayer Advocate) 
(recommending professionalizing tax preparation industry); Fraud in Income Tax Return 
Preparation: Hearing Before H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 109th Cong. 7 (statement 
of Elizabeth Atkinson, President, Board of Trustees, Community Tax Law Project) 
(urging support for “appropriate regulations and safeguards for taxpayers”). 
109 Low Income Taxpayer Protection Act of 2003, S. 685, 108th Cong. (2003) (containing 
provisions to regulate paid preparers). 
110 GAO, OREGON/CALIFORNIA PREPARER REGISTRATION STUDY, supra note 3.  See also 
Maryland Individual Tax Preparers Act, 2008 Md. Laws 623 (imposing registration, 
testing and continuing education requirements for paid preparers). 
111 Bauman and Matzke, supra note 14. 
112 See GAO, OREGON/CALIFORNIA PREPARER REGISTRATION STUDY, supra note 3, at 3.  
The study also found that California’s paid preparer individual returns were on average 
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difference in Oregon was large. Oregon’s 2001 federal returns were on average about 
$250 more accurate than the rest of country.113  According to the GAO, “the odds that a 
return filed by an Oregon paid preparer was accurate were approximately 72 % higher 
than the odds for a comparable return filed by a paid preparer in the rest of the 
country.”114 In contrast, the odds that a comparable California return was accurate were 
approximately 22% lower than for other parts of the country.115  With approximately 1.56 
million individual income tax filers in Oregon, that state’s increased accuracy translates 
to about $390 million more in income taxes paid than if Oregon’s paid-preparer returns 
were prepared at the level of accuracy seen in the rest of the country.116  
GAO’s conclusion after studying the regimes was that it was feasible to adopt a 
national regime that includes preparer education, registration, and, as in Oregon’s case, 
testing.117  GAO cautioned that Oregon’s results did not “conclusively support or refute 
the idea that adopting some or all of the California or Oregon program elements at the 
national level would improve the accuracy of paid preparer returns or reduce the tax 
gap,”118 but that Oregon’s requirements and GAO’s modeling suggests that “an Oregon-
style approach to paid preparer regulation may be beneficial.”119
                                                                                                                                                 
less accurate than the rest of the country.  Id.  For a discussion of the differences in the 
programs, see infra sections IV.A.2-3. 
113 Id. at 17. 
114 Id. at 3.  For example, GAO found that for a return of medium complexity, a return by 
an Oregon paid preparer had a 74% probability of being accurate, compared to only a 
55% probability of accuracy in California. Id. at 16. 
115 Id. at 15-16. 
116 Id. at 17. 
117 Id. at 25. 
118 Id. at 25.  The GAO study acknowledged that other factors may have led to the 
accuracy.  For example, the data did not indicate whether there were higher percentages 
of CPA’s or other already licensed professionals preparing returns in Oregon.  There was 
also no comparison of accuracy prior to California or Oregon’s regulatory regimes, and 
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 In this report, I argue that a tax system that values accountability and visibility for 
return preparers should impose RCET requirements, with one caveat: for a federal RCET 
program to succeed, the IRS must meaningfully track paid preparer performance so that 
the agency will be able to efficiently communicate with—and if necessary move up the 
enforcement pyramid to sanction—preparers who are either incompetent or unscrupulous. 
One important aspect of a federal RCET program is that such a program could facilitate 
preparer compliance with identification requirements and enable the IRS to capture data 
that would allow it to track preparers. I will discuss that below, as well as examine the 
elements of what I believe are important aspects of a RCET regime, highlighting some of 
the differences between the Oregon and California models, and suggesting differences 
that fit into the new paradigm of accountability, visibility and responsibility.120 To 
explore those differences, it is necessary to look at the respective regimes in some detail. 
A. An Examination of the Oregon and California Regulatory Regimes 
1. California 
                                                                                                                                                 
some other states without additional regulatory requirements are also above average in 
paid preparer accuracy, indicating that “regulation over paid preparers alone does not 
explain the differences that we found.”  Id. at 17.  GAO thus “cannot rule out the 
possibility that Oregon or California returns were no more or less likely to be accurate 
than they would have been without the regulation of paid preparers.”  Id. at 4. 
119 Id. at 25. 
120 An important caveat is that there are significant questions about the effect of a RCET 
regime on price of return preparation services.  GAO specifically did not examine the 
effect of either California or Oregon’s regimes on pricing or supply, but it did note that 
Oregon taxpayers were less likely than taxpayers in other parts of the country to use paid 
preparers.  Id. at 22.  Interestingly, GAO considered the possibility that if the Oregon 
regime decreased the likelihood that noncompliant taxpayers would wish to use 
preparers, there might be a compliance effect on self-prepared returns. GAO, however, 
did not find that, and instead found that “[b]ecause Oregon self-prepared returns were no 
less accurate than returns elsewhere in the country, even if this switching occurred it 
likely would not completely offset the increased accuracy of paid preparer returns.”  Id. at 
17, note 33. 
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a. Registration 
California paid preparers who are not attorneys, CPAs, or enrolled agents, must 
register with the California Tax Educational Council (CTEC) to become a CTEC 
Registered Tax Preparer (CRTP).121  As of June 6, 2008, 41,755 paid preparers registered 
with CTEC.122  In addition to registering with the CTEC, a CRTP must: 
• Pay a $25 registration fee to the CTEC, and pay a $25 renewal fee in 
subsequent years; 
• Complete 60 hours of qualifying education, and 20 hours in continuing 
education in subsequent years; 
• Obtain a $5,000 surety bond; and 
• Submit renewal applications once a year to reregister with CTEC.123 
 
Paid preparers who fail to register can be fined up to $5,000.124  Preparers will 
initially be fined $2,500, a fine which will be waived if preparers register with the CTEC 
within 90 days.125  If they fail to register within 90 days, then the fine will increase to 
$5,000.126  There are no criminal background checks required in California and no 
qualifying competency tests.127  
 
b. Enforcement 
In California, CTEC reimburses the state Franchise Tax Board for compliance 
costs.128  FTB has one full time and one part time employee dedicated to the preparer 
                                                 
121 Id. at 9 
122 Id. 
123 Id. at 9, 13-14. 
124 Id. at 10. 
125 Id. at 10, note 22. 




regime.129 Persons suspected of illegally preparing returns are issued penalty letters and 
encouraged to become preparers.130 If they do not register within 90 days FTB can issue 
fines of up to $5,000.131  In June 2005-06, FTB identified 77 individuals as unregistered; 
56 of those people registered within the 90 day period and were not fined.132  Of the 21 
who were fined, 11 registered in the following year, six were issued the $5,000 penalty 
and four stopped preparing.133 Many of these unregistered preparers were identified 




Oregon requires paid preparers who are not already licensed by the state as CPAs 
or attorneys, or working for a CPA, to obtain a state license to prepare tax returns.135  The 
Oregon Board of Tax Practitioners issues two levels of paid preparer licenses:  the 
Licensed Tax Preparer (LTP) license and the Licensed Tax Consultant (LTC) license.136  
Oregon’s requirements for the two exams include137: 
LTP Requirements: 
• A high school diploma or its equivalent; 
• Completion of eighty hours of qualifying education and thirty hours of 
renewing education; 
• Passage of a state administered exam, scoring 75% or higher; 
• Payment of an $80 initial fee, and $80 renewal fee; and 
                                                 
129 Id. at 19. 
130 Id. at 10. 
131 Id. 
132 Id. at 10, note 22 and surrounding text. 
133 Id. 
134 Id. at 11. 
135 Id. 
136 Id. 
137 Id. at 11-12.  For a graphical view of these requirements, see id. at 13-14. 
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• Completion of a minimum of 780 hours of working as a tax preparer in 
two of the last five years; 
• Completion of a minimum of fifteen hours of continuing education if 
already an LTP, or completion of eighty hours of continuing education if 
not already an LTP; 
• Completion of thirty hours of continuing education; [? Doesn’t preceding 
bullet cover continuing education?] 
• Passage of a more advanced exam with a score of at least 75%, though 
enrolled agents need only take the section focused on Oregon laws; and 
• Payment of $95 initial and renewal fees (for LTPs, fee is $65). 
 
b. Enforcement 
In Oregon, the OBTP can issue fines for each return prepared without a license.138 
OBTP also has the authority to assess $5,000 civil penalties or to revoke or suspend the 
license of someone who engages in fraud or illegal conduct or who violates other 
provisions of the Oregon preparer statutes.139 OBTP may also order restitution to 
consumers harmed by fraud.140  From March 2001 to November 2007, OBTP imposed 
about $2 million in fines through 48 disciplinary actions, with one person being fined 
more than $800,000.141  Preparers in Oregon have administrative and judicial appeal 
rights relating to OBPR disciplinary actions.142  
 
                                                 
138 Id. at 12. 
139 Id. 
140 Id. 
141 Only a small percentage of these fines, however, are ultimate collected.  Between 
2005 and 2007, roughly $867,000 in fines were imposed, but only about $75,000 in fines 
and interest were collected.  Id. at 12. 
142 Those penalized under the Oregon regime can appeal these decisions.  OBTP has an 
arrangement with the Oregon Office of Administrative Hearings to provide an 
administrative law judge to hear these appeals.  Appeals can also be brought in the 
Oregon Court of Appeals.  Id. at 12-13. 
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3. A Comparison of Oregon and California’s RCET Regimes 
As GAO indicates, it is not clear why there are differing results in California as 
compared to Oregon.  The study does indicate that there are significant differences 
between the two programs, and the following considers differences that may account for 
GAO’s differing results. 
 
a. Two-Tier Structure 
Oregon uses a two-tiered structure, with a requirement that less experienced 
practitioners, LTPs, must work under more the experienced preparers, the LTCs.143 Both 
tiers must pass examinations demonstrating competence, and LTP’s are effectively 
required to work with more experienced practitioners.144  The requirement that preparers 
work with more seasoned preparers (or an otherwise licensed professional, like a CPA or 
attorney), contributes to a possible mentoring relationship and also might check a new 
preparer with little institutional capital who might be more inclined to act unscrupulously. 
 
b. Education 
There are also additional education requirements in Oregon, compared with 
California, with 30 hours of continuing education in Oregon for both tiers, compared to 
California’s 20 hours, and 80 hours of qualifying education in Oregon compared to 60 
hours in California.145 Given the frequency of tax law changes, the additional 
                                                 
143 Id. at 11. 
144 Id. 
145 See id. at 9-11. 
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requirements may contribute to general competency and allow Oregon to focus preparers 
on new developments. 
 
c. Examination 
In addition, there is an entrance examination relating to competence in federal and 
state tax laws in Oregon for both tiers, and the test has a fairly high percentage of people 
failing: 46% of applicants failed the LTP test and approximately 70% failed the LTC 
test—the more experienced tier.146 That a number of applicants seeking to prepare returns 
failed the tests suggests the possibility that a testing requirement might prevent 
incompetent or unskilled individuals from preparing returns. 
 
d. Minimal Education & Scruples Disclosure 
Oregon requires that applicants have a high school diploma or its equivalent, and 
applicants must also disclose prior criminal convictions or indictments relating to an 
applicant’s honesty.147  There are no such education prerequisites in California, and 
California requires no criminal background check.148  California’s program confers no 
authority to deny registration as long as an applicant completes the education 
requirements and pays the annual fee.149  It is possible that Oregon’s minimal education 
requirement provides a higher floor for preparers, and that Oregon’s additional disclosure 
requirement deters unscrupulous people from entering the paid preparer business.  
 
                                                 
146 Id. at 12. 
147 Id. at 11-12. 
148 See id. at 10. 
149 See id. 
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e. Small Size of Oregon’s Preparer Community 
Given the differences in population between the states, it is not surprising that 
Oregon has far fewer licensed tax preparers than California.  According to recent census 
estimates, California’s population as of July, 2007, is 36,553,215, compared to Oregon’s 
population of 3,747,455.150 The ratio of licensed preparers to population is similar, with 
California having 41,755 CRTPs and Oregon having 1,916 LTPs and 2,077 LTCs, or 
3,933 total licensed preparers.151 The smaller size of Oregon’s preparer community may 
contribute to a more effective relationship between regulator and regulatee.152
 
f. Money Spent on the Program and  Enforcement Costs 
California budgeted approximately $1.2 million for administrative and 
enforcement costs, with most of the money coming from the $25 registration fees and 
other income including fees paid by education providers.153  Total cost per CTRP was 
about $29.154 Oregon also charges for initial registration and renewals ($80 and $95, 
respectively for LTPs and LTCs), and also imposes fees of $50 to take the LTP exam, 
and $85 to take the LTC exam.155 Both states incur enforcement expenses, with CTEC 
                                                 
150 See United States Census Bureau, United States—States; and Puerto Rico: 2007 




9Sc|US-9Sd|US-9Se|US-9Sf|US-9Sg|US-9Sh&-_lang=en [hereinafter Census Numbers]. 
151 GAO, OREGON/CALIFORNIA PREPARER REGISTRATION STUDY, supra note 3, at 9, 12. 
152 Raskolnikov, supra note 35, at 36-37. 
153 GAO, OREGON/CALIFORNIA PREPARER REGISTRATION STUDY, supra note 3, at 18. 
154 CTEC’s budget in 2007 was $1.2 million, and CTEC reported 41,755 CRTPs in June, 
2008, making the per-preparer cost of the program about $29.  Id. 
155 Id. at 19. 
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essentially outsourcing its efforts to the FTB, and OBTP directly incurring the costs.156  
Oregon’s enforcement costs are relatively higher than California’s, given the far fewer 
preparers that the OBTP was regulating.157  Given the administrative and enforcement 
costs, GAO estimates that California spent approximately $29 per licensee, and Oregon 
approximately $123 per licensee.158
 
g. Additional Paid Preparer Costs 
GAO found that education costs for preparers in both states were in the $200-
$300 range per year, with the possibility of higher costs depending on type of program 
and whether the preparers were traveling to attend conferences or training sessions.159 
GAO estimated the total costs associated with Oregon’s program to be $6 million, with 
direct administrative costs amounting to $490,000 of that total, and the balance reflective 
of preparer costs. 160  
4. The Benefit of Oregon’s Plan—Overall Impressions 
The GAO study is an important development in consideration of a possible 
regulatory regime relating to RCET requirements for all paid preparers. The states 
                                                 
156 See id. 
157 In California, CTEC paid FTB $270,000 for enforcement activities in 2007, while 
OBTP incurred roughly $93,000 in enforcement costs.  GAO did note, however, that 
while California’s operating budget is about twice as much as Oregon’s, California 
registers and regulates more than 10 times more preparers than Oregon.  Id. at 19-20. 
158 Id. at 18-19. 
159 Id. at 19-20. 
160 GAO notes that this estimate is conservative, as it counted preparer education time for 
all licensees, including enrolled agents and employees of national chains who already 
have existing educational and testing requirements. Id. At 20. It may underestimate costs 
in that it fails to include possible additional taxpayer preparation fees or possible 
additional taxpayer travel time if there are fewer preparer offices than would otherwise 
exist if no regulatory requirements were in place.  Id. at 20.   
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themselves have not meaningfully analyzed tax returns to track performance and error 
rates, or otherwise mined data that would allow for detailed evaluations of the program’s 
effectiveness.161  It is interesting, however, that both states believe that their programs 
have contributed to the professionalization of the industry and facilitated consumer 
confidence by, for example, allowing consumers to check quickly (e.g., through online 
searches) as to whether a preparer is licensed.162
The GAO analysis strongly supports the benefits of a program like Oregon’s.  
Oregon’s costs, including direct administrative and preparer costs (though as mentioned 
above GAO did not examine the effect of costs on taxpayers), were relatively modest at 
$6 million, and there was an additional $390 million of taxes paid in Oregon as compared 
to what would have been paid if the accuracy of Oregon returns was comparable to that 
of the rest of the country.163  While the study does not prove conclusively that Oregon’s 
requirements contributed to higher accuracy, or that any one aspect of Oregon’s program 
was the factor contributing to the results, it suggests that even if only a small portion of 
the increased revenue is attributable to the program, it is a very good investment. As 
GAO points out, one aspect of evaluating the effectiveness of compliance decisions is in 
relation to general cost benefit calculations, and IRS typically expects a 4 to 1 return on 
compliance expenditures.164
Using the Oregon model as an estimate of a similar program’s costs, it is of 
course likely that imposing a similar federal program will be a significant undertaking. 
The extent of the costs of such a program is limited by the lack of data IRS currently has 
                                                 
161 Id. at 22. 
162 Id. 
163 Id. at 25. 
164 Id. at 21. 
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about the number of unenrolled preparers, but it is interesting that Oregon and California, 
while vastly different states, have a relatively similar ratio of paid preparers to the general 
population, with California’s 41,755 paid preparers comprising 0.11423 percent of the 
population, compared to Oregon’s 3,993 paid preparers comprising 0.10655 percent.165
This equates to a range of approximately 300,000 to 350,000 unenrolled preparers 
at a national level.166 These numbers are admittedly lower than previous IRS estimates167 
To the extent that the testing, registration, and education requirements impose costs on 
those seeking to become paid preparers, they will act as a barrier to entry into the paid 
preparation market.  Assuming direct administrative costs roughly estimated at $100 per 
preparer,168 using Oregon’s figures as a base but reflecting a discount for likely 
economies of scale, that would equate to approximately $30 to 35 million in government-
incurred costs, with additional preparer-incurred costs of $337.62 to 393.89 million, 
                                                 
165 California has 41,755 paid preparers at last count; Oregon has 3,993.  Id.at 9, 12.  
California and Oregon’s respective population estimates are 36,553,215 and 3,747,455.  
Census Numbers, supra note 151. 
166 Using the above figures, Census Numbers, supra note 151, as endpoints, the exact 
range is 321,577-344,541 preparers.  Figures calculated by author] 
167 In 1999, the IRS estimated that there could be as many as 1.2 million paid preparers, 
though this number was given as a very rough estimate, with the IRS noting that the 
actual number could be significantly higher or lower.  GAO, OREGON/CALIFORNIA 
PREPARER REGISTRATION STUDY, supra note 3, at 6.  The National Taxpayer Advocate 
has estimated that of this 1.2 million preparers, as many as 300,000 to 600,000 are not 
subject to any licensing and educational requirements.   National Taxpayer Advocate 
2003 Annual Report to Congress 270. 
168 The costs would have to reflect that preparers and education providers would likely be 
the significant, if not whole source of these costs, through fees that would vary based 
upon the design of any program. The cost estimates below are estimates that assume that 
direct administrative costs of any national program would comprise approximately 8.16% 
of total costs, exclusive of additional costs that may be passed on to taxpayers in the form 
of increased preparation costs.  This is the same ratio that GAO used in considering 
Oregon’s direct and preparer costs, i.e., $490,000 of total $ 6 million were direct 
administrative costs. 
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using the same ratio GAO used in conservatively allocating cost for preparer time and 
educational classes.  
 
5. How to Ensure that the Program Will Maximize Accountability, Visibility and 
Responsibility 
 
One aspect of a national program that neither California nor Oregon emphasizes is 
the possibility that a federal program will significantly enhance communication and 
monitoring of preparer performance. While both states use their lists to contact preparers 
to remind them of requirements and to let them know about changes in the tax law, 
“neither state uses their preparer information to track paid preparer accuracy or for 
enforcement purposes.”169  California does not require preparers to use registration 
numbers on returns they prepare, and while Oregon requires LTCs and LTPs to use 
registration numbers, the requirement is not consistently followed, as preparers use either 
their Preparer Tax Information Number, Social Security Number, or an Employer’s 
Identification Number.170 And the GAO has noted that “neither state has a reliable means 
to track or analyze returns prepared by registered or licensed paid prepares in their 
states.”171
To emphasize accountability, visibility and responsibility, a federal undertaking 
would have to be backstopped by an identification requirement that the IRS would 
meaningfully enforce, as I suggest above in Part III.A.  The current regime of the IRS not 
even being able to tell the number of preparers highlights the lack of scrutiny that 
preparers currently enjoy.  To increase visibility of preparer actions, the IRS, if 
                                                 




administering a federal program, should communicate with preparers to provide them 
information that bears on the likelihood of returns’ accuracy or particular preparers’ 
needs.  This written communication could take different forms, including the issuance of 
an annual data sheet to preparers that would be delivered just prior to filing season.  For 
example, that data sheet could inform preparers of the total number of returns they 
prepared last year, identify information about those returns such as average tax owed, 
number of returns claiming refunds, and also emphasize data about issues that are related 
to areas of systemic noncompliance. In that report, IRS could identify data points that 
demonstrate the preparers’ differences from other benchmarks.  For example, IRS could 
inform preparers who prepare a significant amount of Schedule C returns of a low 
percentage of gross receipts to expenses, or for EITC preparers, of higher average or 
median refunds compared to other taxpayers in a region or state, or other similarly 
situated preparers.172 In effect, IRS could demonstrate to preparers that their actions are 
visible, and borrow from some of the insights that have accompanied high compliance 
                                                 
172 One question for such a program is whether the national system would borrow from 
Oregon’s two-tier approach, with the requirement that preparers work with more 
experienced preparers.  I take no position as to whether such a requirement is feasible on 
a national level, or, even if feasible, desirable, given potential additional costs, although I 
note that the presence of more seasoned professionals may be a means of inculcating a 
sense of professionalism in an industry that appears to be lacking in a uniform sense of 
professionalism. If such a tiered approach is part of a national program, the senior 
preparer would receive information relating to preparers who identified him or her as 
their supervisor, to facilitate office responsibility for preparer conduct. Even if such a 
program is not adopted, any identification scheme would have to reflect and allow IRS to 
track preparers within offices, especially given the prevalence of national chain preparers. 
I would expect that IRS would have authority to share that information with national 
affiliates of chain offices, irrespective of whether the office were franchise-run or run 
directly by the chain itself. 
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rates associated with items reported to the IRS.173  IRS could also identify and report 
trends that indicate potential compliance and service challenges to preparers, such as a 
high percentage of newly licensed preparers in an office, or a high concentration of 
returns claiming a particular credit at a rate inconsistent with national figures. To make 
this communication most effective, and to take into account other resource demands on 
IRS, the communication season should coincide with the time period prior to the 
beginning of filing season. 
The benefits of such an approach are, in my view, significant.  It reflects the 
possibility that the IRS, like modern service or product providers, can track data to more 
effectively tailor its communication, communicate the possibility of a potential sanction 
as a result of preparer noncompliance, and generate possibilities for preparers to 
meaningfully ask the IRS about resources that will enable preparers of good faith to do 
their jobs.  Just as when I log on to the website Amazon.com my portal reflects recent 
purchases and likely future interests, IRS can likewise effectively push out targeted 
information to its audience, in this case preparers.  That many future services to preparers 
will be provided in an online environment enhances the potential for use of information 
and data, once mined.   
The above assumes that a program will not have significant negative unintended 
consequences (such as pushing those who do not comply to self-prepare, or materially 
increase preparation costs), nor will it drive preparers underground to avoid additional 
                                                 
173 Leandra Lederman, Tax Compliance and the Reformed IRS, 51 U. Kan. L. Rev. 971, 
973-74 (2003) (noting that scholars have pointed to several factors, including trust in 
government, taxpayer morale, and the use of tax compliance as a signal to explain 
compliance rates that exceed what would be expected if audit rates and penalties alone 
drove tax compliance). 
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federal responsibilities.  Any federal program will require systematic evaluation of its 
effectiveness174 and costs.  Moreover, it is vital that enforcement backstop any program, 
with a special emphasis on preventing unlicensed preparers from entering and remaining 
in the system, and requiring preparer compliance with any identification requirements. 
The latter point will likely require a commitment on behalf of the IRS to emphasize the 
identification requirement, through on the ground investigators175 and perhaps the 
possibility of expanding whistleblower provisions to include private reward for 
individuals who identify unlicensed preparers to the IRS.176  
 
V. THE INSIGHTS OF RESPONSIVE REGULATION 
A. The Theoretical Background 
                                                 
174 I note that GAO cautioned that other factors in its study had significant influence over 
whether returns were accurate, and especially noted the lower chances of accuracy among 
EITC and sole proprietor returns.  GAO, OREGON/CALIFORNIA PREPARER REGISTRATION 
STUDY, supra note 3, at 32.  It would be helpful to isolate effectiveness of additional 
regulation with respect to specific issues, including those primarily identified in this 
report, i.e., EITC noncompliance and sole proprietor reporting of income. 
175 Oregon kept one full-time investigator on staff in the OBTP to impose fines on 
registered and unregistered preparers for misconduct.  Id. at 19.  Projecting this out on a 
national scale, using Oregon’s 3,993 registered preparers as a baseline, would call for 
roughly 100 investigators working in a similar capacity at the IRS. 
176 Dennis J. Ventry, Jr., Whistleblowers and Qui Tam for Tax, 61 Tax Law. 357, §§ V, 
VI (2008) (urging that whistleblower provisions be expanded to allow private citizens to 
bring qui tam actions against taxpayers for violations of internal revenue laws).  For a 
history of whistleblower laws, and their extension allowing the IRS to pay for tips they 
receive from people noticing tax problems at their workplace, in their day-to-day 
business, see id., § II. The whistleblower regime pegs recovery to total tax recovered, 
thus limiting it as a model for preparers, but one possibility to make this more feasible in 
this context is to tie informant rewards to numbers of returns that an unlicensed preparer 
generates, rather than total amount of tax or other penalty recovered. 
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Much has been written lately about the possible benefits of responsive regulation, 
both in the context of tax regulation177 and government regulation more generally.178  
Responsive regulation is the idea that regulators must be responsive to the conduct of 
those they seek to regulate. The posture of regulator in a responsive regulatory regime is 
not adversarial—at least initially. The premise is that regulators should approach the 
group they seek to regulate cooperatively, with an eye toward solving problems 
collaboratively,  changing toward a more adversarial environment only in the face of non 
response or inadequate response to government efforts.  A regulator, in “deciding 
whether a more or less interventionist response is required” must consider those who will 
be controlled by the regulations.179  “Responsive regulation is not ‘a clearly defined 
program or set of perceptions concerning the best way to regulate’ but rather, a method 
that advances the proposition that regulation should be context-dependant.”180  
Responsive regulation sets forth a regulatory pyramid with a “series of options that a tax 
authority might use to win compliance, sequenced from the least intrusive at the bottom 
to the most intrusive at the top.”181
                                                 
177 See Valerie Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation and Taxation: Introduction, 29 LAW 
& POL’Y 3, 4 (2007) [hereinafter Braithwaite Introduction]. 
178See IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING THE 
DEREGULATION DEBATE (1992).  See also Dennis Ventry, The Collision of Tax and 
Welfare Politics: The Political History of the Earned Income Tax Credit, 1969-99, 53 
Nat’l Tax J. 983 (“[P]olicy alternatives, regardless of their theoretical or analytical 
appeal, will have to complement rather than conflict with social and cultural forces to 
prove successful.”). 
179 Braithwaite Introduction, supra note 178, at 4. 
180 Sagit Leviner, A New Era of Tax Enforcement: From ‘Big Stick’ to Responsive 
Regulation, at 264 in RECENT RESEARCH ON TAX ADMINISTRATION AND COMPLIANCE: 
SPECIAL PAPERS GIVEN AT THE 2006 IRS RESEARCH CONFERENCE, June 14-15, 2006, 
(quoting Ayres & Braithwaite, supra note 179) (internal footnotes omitted). 
181 Id. 
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One key idea behind the insights from this approach is that in many (perhaps 
most) cases, the government does not need to automatically resort to coercion or sanction 
to produce its desired effect, given the resource-intensive nature of that approach and the 
potential that such efforts might backfire.182  Rather than a system based upon this 
responsive regulation model, the United States tax administration has a “command-and-
control operational system to accomplish their mission of catching ‘the scoundrels’ who 
do not pay their taxes.”183
There are several elements critical to effectively implementing a responsive 
regulatory program:184
It refers to the practice of (a) influencing the flow of events (b) through 
systematic, fairly directed and fully explained disapproval (c) that is respectful to 
regulatees, helpful in filling information gaps and attentive to opposing or 
resisting arguments, (d) yet firm in administering sanctions (e) that will escalate 
in intensity in response to the absence of genuine effort on the part of the 
regulatee to meet the required standards.185
                                                                                                                                                 
  
 
Braithwaite Introduction, supra note 178, at 4. 
182 Id. (emphasis original). 
183 Id. 
184 JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESTORATIVE JUSTICE AND RESPONSIVE REGULATION (Oxford 
University Press) (2002). 
185 Braithwaite Introduction, supra note 178, at 5. 
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Tax administration usually operates on the presumption that tax law will influence 
the flow of events when sanctions are sufficiently certain and severe to offset the gains of 
non-compliance (i.e. the traditional rational actor model).186  Responsive regulation on 
the other hand “assumes that there is a responsible moral self that can be drawn out by a 
good regulator and that will enable offenders to change their ways and self-regulate more 
effectively in the future.”187
Recent scholars have noted that IRS general compliance policy has suffered from 
a one-size-fits-all model,188 and have questioned the ability of the IRS to act more nimbly 
as is required of a regime that incorporates at least some elements of a responsive 
regulatory framework.  In my initial report and prior research I have emphasized that the 
IRS must more appropriately consider the varied nature of the tax gap.189 To the IRS’s 
credit, it is acknowledging this in recent proposals to address the tax gap.190
                                                 
186 Id. 
187 Id. 
188 Raskolnikov, supra note 35, at 36-37. 
189 “Both gross and net tax gaps can be subdivided into three main components: the non-
filing gap, the underreporting gap, and the underpayment gap.”  Book, Role of Preparers, 
supra note 1, at 48 (citation omitted); see also id. at 51, 73 (discussing IRS’s need for 
more complete understanding of nature of tax gap and ability to develop programs to 
remedy problems; Leslie Book, Freakonomics and the Tax Gap: An Applied Perspective, 
56 Am. U. L. Rev. 1163, 1167-68 (discussing several sources of tax gap); GAO, FILING 
SEASON, supra note 63, at 3 (“[D]ue to lack of reliable data, IRS’s [tax gap] estimate does 
not include some types of noncompliance . . . Also, IRS is concerned with some of the 
outdated data and methodologies used to estimate the tax gap.  Finally, it is difficult for 
IRS to identify and measure noncompliance . . . when IRS has little or no information 
from third parties about payments made or taxes withheld.”). 
190 GAO, FILING SEASON, supra note 63, at 18 (discussing recent IRS efforts to remedy 
lack of information). 
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How do the insights of responsive-regulation scholars intersect with the reality of 
today’s relationship between the IRS and unenrolled paid preparers? Consider Professor 
Raskalnikov: 
Success of responsive regulation depends critically on a regulator being able to 
decide whether regulatee is willing to comply voluntarily, needs a gentle nudge, a 
threat of substantial sanctions, or a full blown penalty and perhaps even criminal 
prosecution in order to cooperate or comply. To make this determination, the 
regulator must engage with each regulate on a continuous basis.191
 
Raskolnikov notes that given these conditions, it is not surprising that until recent 
application in the Australian, New Zealand and East Timor tax systems; it was not 
surprising that the responsive-regulation concept has largely been applied to smaller 
regulatory communities, where there is more face-to-face contact between regulator and 
regulatee.192
 Underlying this report is that the IRS increase preparer visibility and 
responsibility.193 Relying on technology, the IRS can begin the task of understanding the 
preparer community. The current situation of the IRS not even having reliable estimates 
of the total number of paid preparers makes it difficult if not impossible for the IRS to 
meaningfully interact in the manner that will allow the IRS to gauge the appropriate 
conduct toward preparers.194  
 
                                                 
191 Raskolnikov, supra note 35, at 37. 
192 Id. at 37 n.176. 
193 See supra section IV.A. 
194 I had asked the IRS to develop a report that classified tax returns by their preparers 
and analyzed the data to estimate compliance benchmarks.  The report was difficult to 
create, given the limited information available to the IRS.  TAS researchers worked 
exceptionally hard putting it together, but despite all the hard work and effort, were still 
unable to classify a significant percentage—over 13%—of the returns. (Unpublished IRS  
Preparer Classification Analysis (Sept. 8, 2008)). 
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B. Application to the EITC 
In addition to providing a helpful framework for the need to provide service to 
preparers, the responsive-regulation approach offers additional insights with respect to 
preparers who are engaged in preparing and filing EITC-returns. For example, responsive 
regulation changes the previously binary view of preparers associated with the EITC as 
either facilitators of fraud, or possible case workers to be employed in the traditional 
benefits model.195  Administrators should emphasize explicitly what is implicit in the 
current arrangement with preparers: that there is a partnership between taxpayers, 
preparers and the government. The need to reward good behavior, rather than just ferret 
out bad actors, could change the dynamic in the partnership, and contribute to reinforcing 
compliance.196 In addition, it provides a theoretical context for innovative proposals to 
encourage industry self-regulation,197 such as codes of conduct or best practices, and 
allows the IRS to reward those who reach quality benchmarks or attend training programs 
that exceed what might even be required under a regulatory regime that contemplates 
licensing and registering preparers. 
                                                 
195 See Jeff Engerman, “Administering the Earned Income Tax Credit: Paid Preparers, 
Problems, and Possibilities” 11-15 (May 13, 2006) (unpublished work, on file with 
author) (discussing the traditional caseworker model for public assistance programs, 
where the eligibility is determined ex ante, and the EITC model, where the self-reported 
tax filing undergoes an ex pose review for eligibility). 
196 See Dennis J. Ventry, Cooperative Tax Regulation (Am. Univ. Washington Coll. Of 
Law, Working Paper No. 2008-47, 2008) (describing a regulatory scheme that would 
“raise compliance by explicitly rewarding compliance”); Susan Cleary Morse, The How 
and Why of the New Public Corporation Tax Shelter Norm Compliance, 75 Fordham L. 
Rev. 961, 1012-13 (2006) (describing the Compliance Assurance Program as a 
cooperative program between corporate tax decision-making groups and the IRS); David 
Schizer, Enlisting the Tax Bar, 59 Tax. L. Rev. 331, 355-371 (proposing a regulatory 
framework to align the government’s and lawyers’ interests in tax administration). 
197 Block Comments, supra note 14, at nn. 120-125 and surrounding text (urging that 
industry self-regulation can play a role in alleviating concerns of noncompliance). 
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As others have written, the trick is to encourage positive behavior, while keeping 
the powder dry to deal with those who need more than reward and encouragement.198  
This may be difficult if other actors are behaving improperly, but there are tools that the 
IRS and Congress can use to steer claimants toward better preparers. For example, with 
respect to EITC preparers, positive rewards include favored refund time, differing access 
to the Debt Indicator program or access to IRS information generally, differing 
recordkeeping or due diligence requirements, or explicit discretion from Congress for the 
IRS to modify or waive certain requirements or penalties for preparers who meet certain 
low-error thresholds. In addition, IRS recognition or publication of those who meet 
accuracy benchmarks or who otherwise employ best-practice approaches can help 
encourage those taxpayers who wish to comply to seek better preparers. Such an 
approach would also carry an implicit or even explicit threat that using preparers who are 
at different stages of the pyramid entails additional audit risk. 
C. The Australian Example 
An interesting example of how the IRS can climb the responsive-regulation 
pyramid comes to us by way of Australia.  The Australian Taxation Office’s (ATO) 
efforts to address noncompliance among barristers in New South Wales (NSW) show 
how agency action can respond to the actions of those the agency is regulating.199
                                                 
198 Other metaphors include the velvet glove/iron fist duality or the talk softly and carry a 
big stick. Raskolnikov, supra note 35, at 36.  See Ventry, supra note 197, at 16 (citing 
Leviner, supra note 180). Ventry offers an example of incentivizing timely and correct 
return filing by offering rebates.  Id. 
199 See JOHN BRAITHWAITE, MARKETS IN VICE, MARKETS IN VIRTUE 178-81 (Oxford 
Univ. Press) (2005) (telling story of ATO efforts to fight noncompliance among barristers 
in Australia). 
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In 1999, a tax officer at the ATO noticed that those in the legal profession under 
her review had exceptionally high debts to the ATO.200  While investigating the cause, 
bankruptcy came up as the source of the debts time and time again.201  Doubting that the 
legal market was doomed, she continued the investigation and discovered that wealthy 
lawyers were dodging income tax by repeatedly declaring bankruptcy, leaving the ATO 
as their only real creditor.202
Starting at the bottom of the responsive regulation pyramid, the ATO initially 
approached the NSW Bar Council to address the issue, seeking a self-regulatory solution 
as opposed to a more forceful intervention.203  The Bar Council considered the problem, 
and thought it more appropriate to have it regulated under the NSW Legal Services 
Tribunal as opposed to self-regulation.204  The Tribunal did not have the best track record 
with addressing problems of noncompliance by barristers, and the ATO quickly moved 
up the pyramid, aggressively bringing the most egregious cases before the courts.205  The 
Commissioner also spoke publicly about these schemes, and soon enough, the media got 
                                                 
200 The rate of debt default was ten times higher than the rest of the Australian 
population.  Id. at 178. 
201 Id. 
202 The ATO identified 62 licensed barristers who had declared bankruptcy between 1991 
and 2001, with a third of them declaring bankruptcy repeatedly.  Some of the lawyers had 
declared bankruptcy as many as three times in a decade.  It was also revealed that 
barristers were one of the most active demographic groups investing in mass marketed 
aggressive tax planning schemes.  Id. at 178-79. 




involved.206  Government officials quickly got into the mix, and began intimating that 
reform in the bankruptcy law might be in order.207   
The possibility of prohibiting recently bankrupted attorneys from practicing law 
seemed to light a fire under the NSW Bar Association, which became interested in 
dealing with the problem.208  The end result of this turned out to be some “modest law 
reform,” efforts to de-license those barristers with the most egregious histories of 
noncompliance, and some considerable self-regulatory reform, all of which had the effect 
of increased tax payments by barristers, increased enforcement against those barristers 
who remained noncompliant, and a substantial increase in the number of barristers 
remaining current with their tax returns.209
Though the ATO’s efforts were focused on aggressive tax shelters and outright 
tax avoidance, the IRS can take a page from the ATO playbook in addressing supply-side 
and preparer-initiated errors in returns.  Under this type of regulatory scheme, the IRS 
could seek out those return preparers with unacceptably high error rates, bring the 
problem to their attention, and work with those preparers to create internal controls to 
ensure increased compliance.  An approach like this would likely involve more stringent 
preparer reporting requirements for a number of years.  Those preparers who are able to 
demonstrate the internal controls’ success resulting in increased compliance would have 
lesser or more relaxed reporting requirements, or perhaps report at less regular intervals.  
                                                 
206 The Sydney Morning Herald, for instance, ran a series of front-page stories on the 





The IRS would move up the regulatory pyramid for those who are unable to make a 
similar showing, subjecting them to audits and other more intrusive regulatory efforts. 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The insights from the responsive-regulation literature present an intriguing model 
for IRS interaction with preparers, and provide a theoretical context for a more nuanced 
approach that the IRS should adopt when considering its return preparer strategies, and 
the specific proposals I prescribe for Congress and the IRS to adopt. To some extent, the 
IRS’s current emphasis on preparer education, including the significant resources 
expended on tax forums and other general outreach programs, reflects the IRS’s 
awareness that its interaction with preparers must take a varied approach. This report in 
part, though, is premised upon a paradigm of more personal contact with preparers, with 
those contacts facilitated by heightened identification requirements and a more dedicated 
IRS effort to mine preparer data, which will improve its ability to target communications. 
Thus, a prerequisite for this type of approach is that the IRS must have sufficient 
information regarding who the good and who the bad actors are in the return preparation 
industry.  There is a deep need for the IRS to collect information by type of preparer, and 
to have a nuanced understanding of error rates by preparer and by issue, with a healthy 
dose of qualitative on-the-ground resources backstopping and contributing to 
understandings that the numbers suggest.210 Encouraging good behavior must start with 
the IRS knowing and acting on information about how certain preparers are interacting 
with taxpayers.  
                                                 
210 Cf. GAO, 2007 FILING SEASON, supra note 63, at 18 (discussing IRS plan to develop a 
database to “serve as a centralized repository of paid preparer information”). 
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Changing preparer conduct through audits, heightened penalties, and the use of 
civil injunction proceedings should be undertaken only after the IRS encourages more 
positive steps, and only after the IRS communicates disapproval of what it perceives to 
be improper preparer conduct. For example, rather than defaulting to audit when faced 
with information about likely errors associated with a specific geographic region of a 
national chain, one approach would involve the IRS visiting preparers to discuss best 
practices, or consider why the preparer believes its practices are sufficient. Then, the IRS 
could reveal the existence of information suggesting impermissible error rates associated 
with that preparers’ returns. The IRS could ask that the preparer report back on its 
internal quality control measures, review corporate culture and education, and encourage 
self-regulation before resorting to the resource-intensive exercise of audits, and the 
potential use of civil penalties and injunctions. The compliance stick would come at the 
tail end of government interaction.  
The steps mentioned above are measures that Congress can take to encourage the 
IRS to move in this direction.  For example, the possible legislative change that would 
require registration and certification of preparers211 could help facilitate this.212 This 
possible additional regulation could be the trigger for the IRS to meaningfully track 
information related to preparers and encourage better behavior, while at the same time 
keeping its powder dry for the egregious actors who need more traditional sanction-based 
approaches. It is to be hoped that the approaches I suggest will contribute to greater 
                                                 
211 See Tax Administration Good Government Act, H.R. 1528, 108th Cong. § 
141(a)(1)(A) (2004) (granting Secretary of Treasury with the power to require 
registration of federal income tax return preparers). 
212 See GAO, 2007 FILING SEASON, supra note 63, at 18 (noting that in the event that 
Congress requires registration of preparers, a database could be used as a tracking system 
for enrollment and testing of preparers). 
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preparer visibility, responsibility and competence, and will ultimately allow for the IRS 
and preparers to genuinely work together to improve the accurate reporting of 
information on tax returns as well as make it more difficult for preparers to pass on 
inaccurate information to the IRS.  
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